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NOTES
State Motor Vehicle Franchise Legislation: A
Survey and Due Process Challenge to Board
Composition
I.

INTRODUCTION

In today's economy, franchising is becoming a mature, dynamic, and ever pervasive business activity.' Sales of goods and
services by approximately 492,000 franchise establishments are expected to reach $299 billion in 1979.2 Meanwhile, these establishments employed an estimated 4,150,759 workers in 1977.1
One of the more typical franchising activities is the sale of
motor vehicles. Motor vehicle dealers comprised roughly six to ten
percent of the total number of franchise establishments in the past
decade.4 Despite the decreasing number of motor vehicle franchises,
they have nevertheless managed to dominate every other classification of franchising establishment in total sales volumes.5
The development of the independent 6 franchise as a distribution device began in the earliest days of automobile manufacturing
in response to the unique problems and conditions that surrounded
the automobile industry.7 These franchises, in large part due to the
overwhelming economic power of automobile manufacturers, were
loosely drawn agreements designed through omission, and later exemption, to reduce manufacturers' liability.8 Confronted by courts
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1977-1979, 1 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as FRANCHISING].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. This percentage has declined from 9.8% (37,800 out of 383,908 total franchises)
in 1969 to 7% (31,680 out of 450,800 total franchises) in 1977. Id. at 38-41. Statistics indicate
that the total percentage will continue to decline for 1978 and 1979 to 6.8% (31,600 out of
467,278 total franchises) and 6.4% (31,510 out of 492,379 total franchises) respectively. Id. at
33-34.
5. The following annual figures show the sales of automobile dealers as a percentage of
total sales of all franchises: 1969 (53%); 1970 (49%); 1971 (55%); 1972 (55%); 1973 (55%); 1974
(50%); 1975 (49%); 1976 (52%); 1977 (52%); 1978 (est. 52%); 1979 (est. 52%). See id. at 3337.
6. "Independent" is used to distinguish privately owned dealerships from those that are
actually owned by the manufacturer, called factory branch outlets. Today, virtually all new
cars are sold to the public through independently owned franchised dealers. See L. WHrrE,
THE AUrOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945, 136-37 (1971). During the past few years, only 300 auto
dealer franchises were company owned. See FRANCHISING, supra note 1, at 32-35, 39-40.
7. See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 21-31 infra and accompanying text.
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that universally allowed manufacturers to escape franchise liabilities,9 dealers increasingly turned to legislatures for statutory relief. 0
The resulting extensive state" and federal 2 legislation was designed
to regulate the manufacturer-dealer relationship and to equalize the
power of the dealer vis-a-vis the manufacturer.
This Note briefly traces the rise of the franchise as the primary
automobile distribution device, the problems that confronted early
dealers, and their subsequent inability to secure judicial relief. After
examining dealers' efforts in the legislatures and the resulting statutes this Note points out several infirmities that exist regarding
state automobile franchise regulation. The Note then focuses upon
a particular constitutional challenge to state automobile franchise
legislation. Finally, the Note concludes that such legislation is either genuinely ineffective or leads to the anomalous result that dealers assume more powerful positions with respect to their manufacturers through unconstitutional means. Based upon these conclusions, the Note proposes reform and/or abolition of state and federal
regulation of manufacturer-dealer franchise relationships.
II.
A.

THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS

The Rise of the Franchise as an Automobile Distribution
Device

Retail outlets generally take one of three forms. At one extreme
is the independent retailer, exemplified by the corner drugstore. His
independence is usually safeguarded because he is not a "captive"
of any one manufacturer. Instead, the manufacturer or wholesaler
from whom he buys is only one of many possible sources of supply.
At the other end of the spectrum is the agent who may be a branch
Somewhere within that continor subsidiary of the manufacturer.
3
uum is the franchised dealer.
Franchising has been described as "a preferred method of distribution by companies of all sizes [providing] an easy and efficient
distribution system at little cost and with little of the irritations and
9. See notes 32-44 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 53-69 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 94-195 infra and accompanyng text.
12. See notes 72-93 infra and accompanying text.
13. Case law recognizes that franchises are neither pure sales contracts nor pure agency
contracts. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories Co., 129 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir.
1942); Marrinan Medical Supply, Inc. v. Fort Dodge Serum Co., 47 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir.
1931); Laveson v. Warner Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp. 124, 125-26 (D.N.J. 1953); Kane v. Chrysler
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Del. 1948); Note, Dealer FranchiseAgreements, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 1010, 1015-16 (1950). The difficulties in fitting the relationship into established categories are discussed in C. HEwrrTr, AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 189-206 (1956).
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responsibilities of an integrated system." 4 It has also been termed
the "last frontier of the independent businessman" due to its appeal
to the twelve percent of the population whose skin color has prevented their meaningful participation in the economic mainstream'5
and the millions of ordinary citizens whose life savings are available
to acquire their own business.'6 Franchising continues to offer growing opportunities for minority participation."
These factors, however, were of little consequence during the
birth of the automobile industry. In its infancy, the automobile
industry consisted of a number of small producers with limited capital and production facilities.s Sales were originally made directly to
the consumer from the manufacturer. This method of distribution,
however, soon proved inadequate. The consumer demanded services
that the manufacturer was not in a position to render. Further, this
system required a large capital investment in sales outlets-capital
that was necessary for expansion of production facilities."
Consequently, manufacturers developed independent distribution systems under which automobiles were sold to independent
dealers who then sold to the consumer. The franchised dealers, originally designated as "exclusive agents," paid substantial cash deposits in advance of cars ordered, and paid the balance upon delivery. This arrangement provided an important source of working
capital for the manufacturer. It also freed capital by providing
showrooms and repair and storage facilities.21 Due to the designation
of these dealers as "agents," however, liability was often imposed
upon the manufacturers for breach of warranty, 2' misrepresentation, 22 nonperformances,2 and wrongful termination. 4 The manufacturers unsuccessfully sought to remedy the situation by avoiding
agency language and designating the dealer a "vendee."
The problems of the franchise, however, did not become press14.

H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: RALrrms AND REMEDIS 2 (2d ed. 1978).

15. Sayre, FranchisingIn The Ghetto, 25 Bus. LAW. 73 (Special Issue 1969).
16. See Brown & Cohen, Franchising:ConstitutionalConsiderationsFor "Good Cause"
State Legislation, 16 Hous. L. REv. 21 (1978).
17. FRANCHISING, supra note 1, at 7-8.
18. L. SELTZER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 19 (1928).
19. For a complete account of the factors that led to the development of the franchise
method of distribution, see C. HEWrrr, supra note 13.
20. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Financeof the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1956).
21. Columbia Motors Co. v. Williams, 209 Ala. 640, 96 So. 900 (1923).
22. Joslyn v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 177 F. 863 (6th Cir. 1910).
23. Dildine v. Ford Motor Co., 159 Mo. App. 410, 140 S.W. 627 (1911).
24. Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912).
25. This designation, however, failed to insulate the manufacturer completely from
liability. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:385

ing until concentration of production and excess capacity forced
manufacturers to drive their dealers for volume sales.26 Manufacturers then made efforts to exercise more control over dealers' capital
investments, sales quotas, business policies, and promotional efforts.2 7 The manufacturer was able to gain such control by using his
superior bargaining position to obtain advantageous agreements
with his dealers. 28 The control was manifested through retention by
the manufacturer of the power of termination. Initially the franchise
could be terminated "for cause," or for "unsatisfactory" dealer performance. Later, termination was possible at the will of the manufacturer. 29 As a result, the dealer, fearing the loss of the substantial
capital invested in his dealership, was extremely vulnerable to pressure exerted by the manufacturer to increase car quotas, a measure
that often burdened the dealer with unwanted cars and parts. 0
26. As stated by one commentator:
[By 1920] technological improvements left the manufacturer with large production
capacities and high fixed costs. These fixed costs had to be amortized over a large
amount of production (and sales) if the manufacturers were to realize profits. These and
other factors led to a shift in the emphasis of dealer controls. The new emphasis was on
volume. The manufacturers put pressure on their dealers to both maintain and increase
their quotas.
C. HEwrrr, supra note 13, at 65.
27. S. REP. No. 1879, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1956).
28. In Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688
(1940), the court stated:
An examination of its terms, which are many, indicates that it was dictated by the
manufacturer at Detroit, and drawn by its counsel with the avowed purpose of protecting
the manufacturer to the utmost and granting, if any, few rights to, and the smallest
possible protection of, the agent.
It is one which affords some support for the wisdom and necessity of legislation
which protects the weak against a strong party in situations like the instant one.
113 F.2d at 619.
29. See Note, supra note 13, in which the commentator stated:
In practice, whether the manufacturer can control his dealers depends upon how necessary it is to them to retain his franchise. Where the dealer does become dependent upon
the manufacturer, the chief function of the franchise is not to provide particular controls
over the dealer's operations, since economic leverage alone is sufficient, but to preserve
the manufacturer'sultimate sanction, which is his ability to terminate the relationship
without being subjected to large liability in damages for breach of contract.
Id. at 1012 (emphasis supplied).
30. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); FTC, REPORT ON THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc. No.
468, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1075 (1939) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. The manufacturer's power is best illustrated by a case in which it was used to the utmost. Ford once used
its power to refinance its manufacturing plant. In early 1921, Ford was faced with obligations
of approximately $58,000,000 incurred as a result of the Ford family's purchase of minority
interests in the company. The obligations came due during a business recession that had
retarded car sales and lowered car prices, but had not yet reduced the costs of materials and
parts. Ford continued full production during late 1920, but held its purchases of parts to a
minimum, transforming its stock of parts into finished automobiles. The Company then shut
down the plant and shipped the cars to the dealers with sight drafts attached to the bills of
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Thus, as one commentator3 noted, the automobile franchise became
a "contract of adhesion." '

B. The Dealers' Early Defeats in the Courts
Confronted with dealer actions brought to enforce franchise
agreements, the courts, with few exceptions, sustained the manufacturer's interpretation of the agreement. Several stated that the
dealers failed to state a cause of action when suit was brought on
the agreement alone.3 2 Typical of the manufacturer's defenses to the
agreement were the following:
(1) That it did not constitute a legal contract;
(2) That it lacked mutuality, and represented no legally enforceable
obligation on the part of the seller to sell or on the part of the dealer to buy;
(3) That it provided that the dealer shall perform to the satisfaction of
the seller, and that the question of satisfaction is for the seller alone to determine;
(4) That no damages were recoverable by the dealer since loss of profits
were not contemplated by the parties;
(5) That it was unenforceable and void because of indefiniteness, uncertainty and lack of consideration;
(6) That, if valid, the agreement gave the factory the right to terminate
at will.3

For many decades, the invalidity argument was the most powerful
weapon available to manufacturers in defending damage suits by
dealers.3 It was honored by most courts, provided the manufacturer
engaged in careful draftsmanship. 5 In the late thirties, however, the
courts' attitude began to change, even with regard to terminableat-will franchises.3 6 Nevertheless, dealers were usually unable to
recover if the manufacturer terminated or failed to renew the agreement.37
lading. Dealers were thus forced to buy a surplus of 130,000 vehicles and thereby accept the
burden of meeting the Company's obligations. See generally J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITiCS
OF DISTRIBUTION 118-19 (1955).
31. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66
YALE L.J. 1135, 1155 (1957).
32. S. REP. No. 1879, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1956).
33. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956).
34. See, e.g., Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., 262 F. 116 (8th Cir. 1919);
Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Auto. Co., 201 F. 499 (7th Cir. 1912); Velie Motor Car
Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., 194 F. 324 (7th Cir. 1912).
35. See Kessler, supra note 31, at 1150.
36. See, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1940); Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940).
37. Even when dealers overcame these obstacles, the manufacturer could escape liability by arguing that the alleged damages were not "within the contemplation of the parties"
or because he had successfully insulated himself by nonliability clauses. Kessler, supra note
31, at 1152.
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With several defenses blunted, manufacturers began to invoke
termination clauses regularly in order to control dealers and their
operations. 8 Even though the courts were totally aware of the onesidedness of the franchise contract, dealers' challenges to such terminations were generally rejected. The oft-cited decision of Ford
Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co. is characteristic of this sincere
belief in freedom of contract."' The court stated:
It appears that the [dealer] has been disappointed in its expectations and has

been dealt with none too generously by the [manufacturer]; but, while we
sympathize with its plight, we cannot say from the evidence before us that

there has been a breach of binding contract which would enable it to recover

damages. While there is a natural impulse to be impatient with a form of
contract which places the comparatively helpless dealer at the mercy of the
manufacturer, we cannot make contracts for parties or protect them from
provisions of contracts which they have made for themselves. Dealers doubtless accept these one-sided contracts because they think that the right to deal
in the product of the manufacturer, even on his terms, is valuable to them,
but, after they have made such contracts, relying upon the good faith of the
manufacturer for the protection which the contracts do not give, they cannot,
when they get into trouble, expect the courts to place in the contracts the
protections which they themselves have failed to insert. 4'

The courts also refused to impose a condition of good faith upon
the manufacturer's power to terminate." Thus, the court in
Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.42 stated:
With a power of termination at will so unmistakably expressed, we certainly
cannot assert that a limitation of good faith was anything the parties had in
mind. Such a limitation can be read into the agreement only as an overriding
requirement of public policy. This seems an extreme step for judges to
take. . . . [G]enerally speaking, the situation arises from the strong bargaining position which economic factors give the great automobile manufacturing
companies: the dealers are not misled or imposed upon, but accept as nonetheless advantageous an agreement in form bilateral, in fact one-sided. To attempt to redress this balance by judicial action without legislative authority
38. S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956) (the threat of termination made the
dealer a "pliable tool").
39. 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933).
40. Id. at 1006. See also S.B. McMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469, 473
(E.D.S.C. 1925) ("they are entirely within their rights in so framing their contract as to carry
out their intention. The intentions of the parties in the absence of any ground of public policy
must prevail, and their intention must be gathered from the terms of the contract itself.").
The provision from Kirkmyer was referred to in both the House and Senate Reports on the
Dealer's Day In Court Act as "representative of the thinking of the courts," S. REP. No. 2073,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956), and as demonstrating how "application of contract law concepts
by the courts has prevented relief to the dealer." H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1956). Commentators similarly have criticized this view of the courts. See Kessler, supra
note 31, at 1156 ("unwarranted" and "unrealistic"); Comment, The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act: A "New Departure" in Federal Legislation?, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 253, 256 (1957).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956); Kessler, supra note 31, at
1156.
42. 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
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appears to us a doubtful policy. We have not proper facilities to weigh economic factors, nor have we before us a showing of the supposed needs which
may lead the manufacturers to require these seemingly harsh bargains."

This policy of judicial noninterference tended to increase the
coercive practices of manufacturers toward their dealers." As the
court's comment in Bushwick illustrates, the courts were asking for
legislative solutions to the dealers' problems. The courts, however,
were not alone in that plea. Once it became apparent that individual lawsuits would not solve their problems, the dealers also appealed to state and federal legislatures for statutory relief.
C.

Dealers' Appeals to Congress

1. The National Industrial Recovery Act
The dealers, threatened both by the vertical power of the manufacturers and the rigors of competition, turned to group action as a
means of policing the latter and countering the former. 5 The chief
spokesman for dealer demands was the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA), founded in 1917.11 The group action did not
begin to gain momentum, however, until the Great Depression.
The dealers initially attempted to use laws already on the books
to their advantage. The first step was utilization of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NRA).4 7 The Act provided that members
of an industry could create a code of fair competition in order to end
cutthroat practices. It was hoped that this exemption from the antitrust laws would help end the depression. The automobile dealers'
NRA code protected the dealers from the hazards of price competition," leading commentators to term the period under the NRA as
the "golden age of dealers."'"
The manufacturers, however, loathed the period of the NRA.
Although their opposition centered primarily upon the NRA's labor
provisions, the retail codes also caused concern. The lack of aggres43. Id. at 677.
44. See Note, Statutory Regulation of Manufacturer-DealerRelationships in the Automobile Industry, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1242 (1957).
45. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 30, at 122.
46. Id. at 128.
47. 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
48. The dealers' NRA code forbade sales below list price plus taxes, extra equipment,
and transporation and handling costs. It also prohibited certain "unfair" trade practices. The
heart of the code, however, was the control of trade-in allowances. A code "Blue Book,"
published by NADA, listed used car values for given market areas. It was an unfair practice
to grant allowances in excess of those published values. See generallyJ. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra
note 30, at 123. For a description of the code provisions, see FTC REPORT, supra note 30, at
366-67.
49. See Kessler, supra note 31, at 1168.
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sive dealer competition caused a reduction in the demand for automobiles.5 Thus, after the death of the NRA,5 ' the manufacturers'
pressure defeated attempts to retain the benefits of the NRA code
through self-regulation.52
Following the loss of the NRA, dealers sought to retain its code
and Blue Book. It was obvious, however, that under the existing
antitrust laws the dealers could not achieve their objective-to engage in pure price-fixing. The dealers thus concluded that new laws
were needed. Although they initially gained some minimal success
in the states, they looked primarily to the federal government for
relief.
The FTC Study and the Proposed Motor Vehicle Act of 1940
Unsatisfied with their limited success in the state legislatures,
dealers appealed to congressmen of states that had passed legislation for federal aid. Ironically, those dealers who enjoyed the broadest state protection led the call for federal action. 3 The campaign
began with Wisconsin Representative Gardiner Withrow's introduction of the "Withrow Resolution."54 The resolution directed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) "to investigate the policies employed
by manufacturers in distributing motor vehicles, accessories, and
parts, and the policies of dealers in selling motor vehicles at retail,
as these policies affect the public interest." 55 After many hearings,
the resolution was passed, authorizing an investigation on a scale
far exceeding that contemplated by its sponsor.
The conduct of the hearings was largely unsympathetic toward
the manufacturers. Meanwhile, the dealers believed they had found
a receptive and sympathetic ear. The dealers, however, were ultimately disappointed by the results of the FTC study that57 described the operations and history of manufacturers, manufacturerdealer relations, competition, and trade practices.
The Commission did find that there was a high degree of concentration within the motor vehicle industry and that by virtue of
2.

50. Id.
51. The legislation was struck down as giving the force of law to regulatory codes drawn
up by private industry associations. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). Schecter will raise its head as a viable approach to striking down some provisions of
state motor vehicle franchise regulation. See note 169 infra.
52. See J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 30, at 123-30.
53. Id. at 133.
54. H.R.J. Res. No. 87, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 52 Stat. 218 (1938).
55. Id.
56. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 30, at 134.
57. The FTC conducted a fairly thorough and extensive investigation before submitting
its 1077 page report to Congress on June 5, 1939. See FTC REPORT, supra note 30.
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their great vertical power, manufacturers were able to impose
"unfair and inequitable conditions of trade" upon their dealers.- It
pointed out, however, that this power had been used in furtherance
of vigorous competition, and that despite their great size and power,
manufacturers were innocent of price-fixing or other monopolistic
restraints commonly associated with great size and power. Therefore, the Commission stated:
Active competition among automobile manufacturers, although some of them
have made very large profits, gave to the public improved products, often at
substantially reduced prices. . . . Such competition has been the basis for the
remarkable growth of the industry. Consumer benefits from competition in the
automobile-manufacturingindustry have probably been more substantial
than in any other large industry studied by the Commission."

Since the FTC found great size compatible with effective competition, it recommended only moderate limits upon the manufacturer's
vertical power."' Furthermore, the FTC, while heaping praise and
only mild condemnation upon the manufacturers, had little praise
for the practices of the dealers, the very parties whose efforts had
led to initiation of the study. Although it found that the individual
dealer was competitive in his general push to sell motor vehicles, the
FTC nevertheless found that dealers had often seriously limited
competition.'
58. Id. at 1058. For example, the FTC found that:
[M]anufacturers .

.

. by reason of their great power .

.

. have been, and still are,

imposing on their respective dealers unfair and inequitable conditions of trade, by requiring such dealers to accept, and operate under, agreements that inadequately define
the rights and obligations of the parties and are, moreover, objectionable in respect to
defect of mutuality; that some dealers, in fact report that they have been subjected to
rigid inspections of premises and accounts, and to arbitrary requirements by their respective . . . manufacturers to accept for resale quantities of motor vehicles or other
goods, deemed excessive by the dealer, or to make investments in operating plants or
equipment without adequate guaranty as to term of agreement or even supply of merchandise; and that adequate provisions are not included for an equitable method of
liquidation of such investment.
Id. at 1075-76.
59. Id. at 1074 (emphasis supplied). Keep this statement in mind when one reads the
legislative findings that ostensibly are the basis for state motor vehicle franchise legislation.
See notes 96-108 infra and accompanying text. If the consumer is already reaping benefits
why is legislation needed to protect him?
60. It is recommended that present unfair practices be abated to the end that
dealers have (a) less restrictions upon the management of their own enterprises; (b)
quota requirements and shipments of cars based upon mutual agreement; (c) equitable
limitation in the event of contract termination by the manufacturer; (d) contracts definite as to the mutual rights and obligations of the manufacturers and the dealers,
including specific provision that the contract will be continued for a definite term unless
terminated by breach of reasonable conditions recited therein.
Id. at 1076.
61. [L]ocal associations of motor-vehicle dealers . . . have engaged in the following practices to fix or maintain prices: (1) Fixing minimum prices on new cars, often by
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In summary, the FTC found a vertical abuse of power and
concluded that franchise agreements needed revision. The dealers'
expectations of remedial legislation resulting from the study, however, were dashed by the FTC's criticisms of the dealers' activities.
Moreover, as one commentator noted, the FTC's value judgments
focused upon the consumer's interests and the absence of deception,
fraud, and power. Thus, the interests of dealers and consumers were
not necessarily coextensive.

2

Furthermore, it has been postulated

that even the FTC's slight criticisms of the manufacturers were
based upon the "explicit or implicit assumption that it is against
the public interest for the automobile manufacturers to exercise
such extensive controls over large numbers of 'independent' businessmen (their dealers)."3 This "not only begs the crucial question"
but also appears contradictory to findings that manufacturer control actually might have been in the public interest. 4
With the unsatisfactory results of the FTC study behind them,
the dealers persuaded Congressman Wright Patman to introduce
means of uniform maximum discounts from the manufacturer resale prices in transactions where no trade-ins are involved; (2) establishing maximum purchase prices, or
allowances, for used cars taken in trade; (3) regulating bidding on used cars taken in
trade by means'of uniform price increases on all bids subsequent to the original bids to
be less than the original bid; and (4) adopting published used-car price guides as a basis
for maximum allowances for used cars ... [and] many local associations operate usedcar valuation or appraisal bureaus that are essentially combinations of dealers ... to
restrict competiton in used car trading.
Id. at 1074-75. See J. PALAMOUNTAN, supra note 30, at 136-37.
62. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 30, at 138.
63. C. HEWrrr, supra note 13, at 102-03.
64. Id. at 103. As Professor Hewitt states:
On numerous occasions the Commission pointed out various steps (control measures)
taken by the manufacturer to both strengthen dealers and to lower the costs of distribution to the consumer. It may be true that the manufacturers have used some of these
controls to put an unfair emphasis (from the economic standpoint of the dealer) on
volume sales of new cars; but it is also true that many of the controls have resulted in
net benefits to both dealers and consumers. The Commission specifically condemned
certain practices used by some dealers-yet the manufacturers (in many cases) have
been the major effective force trying to hold these practices to a minimum.
Id. (emphasis supplied). See also text accompanying note 59 supra. Furthermore, as one
commentator noted, the manufacturer-dealer relationship is perhaps not as one-sided as
one might think. For instance, the mere publicity of the FTC investigation caused a vast improvement in manufacturer-dealer relations, which suggests the dependence of the manufacturer upon his dealers and his desire not to lose large numbers of them and to increase
the valuation of dealer goodwill. The two-sidedness of the power relationship was also shown
by the dealers' admission that things were not so bad in spite of specific instances of unreasonableness. The commentator thus concludes that the manufacturer's power actually was
limited and had not been generally abused. Instead, it was the mere existence of this power
and the possibility of abuse that was feared. Applying a rule of reason to this market power,
the manufacturer's power does not have undesirable results and actually passes "the performance test with high grades." See J. PmAMouNTAmn, supra note 30, at 141-51.
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the "Motor Vehicle Act of 1940." e The proposed Act provided for
FTC regulation of franchise agreements, all of which were required
to be of at least three years duration. The bill also placed certain
duties upon any manufacturer who opted to exercise control over his
dealers." It also sharply curtailed the manufacturer's right of termination.'
The bill, however, met with a strange fate. The dealers, who in
1939 had so urgently called for federal legislation, indicated that a
decisive majority of their numbers was against it." One commentator speculated that this reaction was due to the FTC's criticism of
dealers and the publicity given this fact by opponents of the bill.
Furthermore, the bill contained many provisions that regulated
dealer practices and dealers feared that this would portend more
extensive federal regulation." The bill gave dealers a measure of
protection similar to that under many state statutes and broader
than later federal legislation. Thus, it is difficult to understand the
dealers' position unless they felt that the bill, like the FTC study,
regulated manufacturers and dealers in a manner that was fair to
both, rather than weighted totally in favor of the dealers.
3.

The Federal Dealers' Day In Court Act

The movement for federal legislation was revitalized in the
1950's post-war period by the development of a buyer's market and
the consequent increase in competition among the dealers. In this
environment threats of termination or nonrenewal increased manufacturers' control over dealer policies and quotas, particularly when
coupled with the increase in dealers' capital investment. The increased dealer agitation spawned several Congressional investigations,7 0 which collectively resulted in the Automobile Dealer's Day
65. See generally C. HEwIr, supranote 13, at 107-09. For a complete text of the bill,
see id. at 206.
66. If the manufacturer regulated the dealer's facilities and activities, he would have
to agree to purchase all of the dealer's assets on termination. The manufacturer also had to
comply with his duty to deliver a certain number of automobiles, had to define "adequately"
the duties of its agents, and could not ship except on written order. Id. at 108.
67. A franchise agreement could be cancelled only on 180 days' notice for cause. These
causes had to be enumerated in the franchise agreement and approved by the FTC. Any
violation of the Act was the basis for a civil action for treble damages. Id. at 108-09. Thus,
the Act would have given dealers many of the rights they now enjoy under the state laws.
See notes 94-195 infra and accompanying text.

68. J.

PALAMOuNTAm,

supra note 30, at 140.

69. Id. See also C. Hawrrr, supra note 13, at 109-10.
70. E.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Automobile Marketing Practices of the
Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); Hearings
on Dealer FranchisesBefore the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., § 26 (1956); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Marketing Legislation
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In Court Act. 7'
(a)

Scope and Application

The Act provides that an automobile dealer may bring an action for damages and recovery of attorneys' fees when the manufacturer does not use "good faith in performing its obligations under a
''7 -The bill's primary purpose
dealer franchise or in terminating it.
was "to correct the abuses of arbitrary termination and nonrenewal. ' '73 Significantly, the Act does not legislate contract terms; thus,
the dealer is not guaranteed a "fair" contract. 7 The Act, however,
which covers only written franchise agreements, 75 has been interpreted to have some effect upon contract terms. Thus, courts have
held that when the manufacturer sets unreasonable or unrealistic
sales goals and then selectively terminates dealers for failure to
the manufacturer's actions lack good faith and
meet these goals,
7
Act.
the
violate
(b)

The Meaning of "Good Faith"

The vital element of the Act is the "good faith" concept. This
element was included in the bill specifically to overrule such cases
as Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. ,7 in which
the courts had refused to require a duty of good faith on the part
of the manufacturer. The Act, in final form 7l defines "good faith"
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956);
Hearings on General Motors Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). An excellent overview of the entire
process of these hearings is given by Professor MacAulay in his landmark law review article,
MacAulay, Changing A Continuing Relationship Between A Large CorporationAnd Those
Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, And The Legal System, 1965
Wis. L. REV. 483, 740, and his book based substantially upon the article, S. MACAULAY, LAW
AND THE BALANCE OF POWER-THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACruRERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966).
71. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976)).
72. S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
73. Id. at 6. The bill was also meant to "supplement the antitrust laws of the United
States, in order to balance the power now heavily weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers." See H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
74. The Act applies "irrespective of contract terms." H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1956).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1221(b) (1976), which defines "franchise" as a "written agreement
or contract."
76. See, e.g., Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d 901, 912 (9th Cir.
1978).
77. 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940). See S.REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956).
78. The definition of good faith as originally drafted required each party to act in a
"fair, equitable, and nonarbitrary manner so as to guarantee such other party freedom from
coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation, so as to preserve all equities of
such other party which are inherent in the nature of the relationship between such parties
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as "the duty of each party to any franchise . . .to act in a fair
and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the
one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party."79 This provision concerned manufacturers, who expressed the fear that it could be interpreted to prevent manufacturers from cancelling a "nice but inefficient dealer" or that normal persuasive selling methods would be
termed "coercion" or "bad faith" under the Act. Therefore, for the
sake of neutrality an important proviso, drafted by Ford Motor
Company's legal department, was added to the definition of "good
faith." 80 That proviso stated: "Provided, That recommendation,
endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not
be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith."8
Much of the argument about the interpretation of "good faith"
under the Act has been concerned with whether the statute protects
a dealer from any failure to act in a fair and equitable manner or
whether it protects him only from coercion or intimidation. Dealers
pressed for the former interpretation because it injects personalities
and the individual dealer's plight into the equation. Manufacturers,
however, wanted decisions to be based on more impersonal factors
that were concerned with the business success of both the dealer and
manufacturer. The courts have generally responded by limiting the
8' 2
Act to situations in which the dealer can show "coercion.
"Coercion" includes "forcing" unwanted vehicles and parts, threats
of termination, withholding deliveries, and appointment of stimula3
tor dealers.1
by such franchise." H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1956) (emphasis supplied).
This language caused great consternation to the manufacturers. The balance of power would
suddenly have shifted toward the dealers since even a dealer with poor sales might have
"equities," whatever these are supposed to be. See S. MAcAuLAY, supra note 70, at 61.
Arguments were made that such language built "for dealers a sanctuary of competition." See
id. at 63. Accordingly, the "equities" language was deleted ostensibly to "preclude any interpretation inconsistent with antitrust principles." H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1956). This is yet another factor to keep in mind when analyzing the state legislation that
uses language strikingly similar to that rejected by Congress. See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1976).
80. See S. MAcAuLAY, supra note 70, at 67-69. As Professor MacAulay notes, here the
manufacturers won a major victory while the sponsors paid a high price for neutrality.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1976).
82. E.g., Ed Houser Enterprises v. General Motors Corp., 595 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1979);
Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1978); Lawrence Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 461 F.2d 608 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 981 (1972);
Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 896 (1963); Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962).
83. See Kessler, supra note 31, at 1179. Note that these practices are those to which
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Thus, through the Act's definition of good faith, the dealer is
given much more in the way of protection from the manufacturer's
whims than he had under prior case law. The Act prevents the
manufacturer from using coercive tactics to injure the dealer. It does
not, however, guarantee that the dealer is free from manufacturer
actions that are noncoercive, albeit unfair. Although this is undoubtedly disappointing to dealers, one must remember that the
purpose of the statute is to balance the scales, not to tip them
toward the dealer; in this regard the Act seems successful.
(c) The Manufacturer's Defense
Only dealers are authorized to bring suit under the Act." Thus,
although both parties are commanded by the Act to deal in good
faith, the dealer's lack of good faith is relevant only when raised as
a defense by the manufacturer." Apparently, the primary use of this
defense would be to defeat an action by a "bootlegging" dealer-one
who unloads cars at low prices to the used car dealers." One commentator has suggested that because dealer coercion is rare, the
manufacturer's good faith defense should be used to mitigate the
dealer's damages rather than as a complete defense." If it is rare,
however, perhaps it should be a complete defense, particularly since
the manufacturer does not have a cause of action for bad faith under
the Act.
One interesting possibility of a defense by the manufacturer
concerns the interplay of the Federal Act with the state statutes. For
instance, suppose that a manufacturer was being charged what he
felt to be unreasonable rates by the dealer for warranty rate reimbursement, over which some states give the dealers total control.8
The manufacturer terminates the dealer, who then sues under the
federal statute, alleging that the manufacturer did not terminate in
the state statutes are primarily addressed. See notes 153-56 infra and accompanying text. See
also S. MACAULAY, supra note 70, at 103-35.
84. This disturbed some members of Congress as is evident by the Minority Report's
comment that this omission was "contrary to traditional legal concepts." H.R. REP. No. 2850,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1956).
85. The defense apparently was added only as an afterthought in order to give the Act
the appearance of "mutuality." See Comment, supra note 40, at 263.
86. 102 CONG. REC. 10571 (1956) ("[A bootleg dealer] would not dire to go into court
because such activity on his part would obviously be bad faith"). See also 102 CONG. REc.
13116 (1956) (When Senator O'Mahoney was apprised of the House Report's statement that
bootlegging could not be used as a defense, he stated that "In a suit by a dealer, a manufacturer should be free by way of defense to introduce. . . evidence of bootlegging by the dealer,
if this can be shown to constitute coercion or intimidation or threats of same").
87. See Comment, supra note 40, at 265.
88. The analysis of these warranty reimbursement rates will be fully developed later in
this Note. See notes 159-73 infra and accompanying text.
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good faith. The manufacturer then defends on the basis of the
dealer's lack of good faith in coercing the manufacturer8 ' under the
state warranty statute. In situations such as these, there emerges
the need for more federal/state coordination, at a minimum."
(d) Summary
The Federal Act thus gives dealers a cause of action to remedy
the injustices that allegedly had been heaped upon them by the
manufacturers prior to its passage. It allows recovery of damages
and costs of a suit if the manufacturer failed to act in "good faith,"
but allows the manufacturer to raise only the defense of lack of good
faith on the part of the dealer. The Act provides a three year statute
of limitations" and states that no provisions shall repeal, modify,
or supersede any provision of the federal antitrust laws. 2 More importantly, at least for purposes of this Note, is section five of the
Act, which provides that "[tihis chapter shall not invalidate any
provision of the laws of any State except insofar as there is a direct
conflict between an express provision of this chapter and an express
provision of State law which cannot be reconciled.'

3 This

provision

is the springboard for the extensive state legislation that is the focal
point of this Note.
D. State Motor Vehicle FranchiseLegislation
Even though the Dealer's Day In Court Act seems to give the
dealers ample protection, many dealers, still unsatisfied, successfully turned to the state legislatures for the leverage with which to
change manufacturer-dealer relations. Of the fifty states, all but
five" have legislation that focuses directly upon the automobile
manufacturer-dealer relationship. The statutes take varying ap89. Although some commentators state that it is unlikely that a dealer will be able to
"coerce" a manufacturer, the result under some state statutues is just that-particularly
when the dealer unilaterally sets warranty rates and the manufacturer has an appeal on the
reasonableness of that rate to a commission that is often composed of automobile dealers.
See notes 115-17 infra and accompanying text.
90. In fact, this Note proposes more than merely increased coordination. See Part IV
infra.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1223 (1976).
92. Id. § 1224.
93. Id. § 1225.
94. Alaska, Delaware, Missouri, Oregon, and Wyoming. Of these, only Oregon and
Wyoming have no franchise statutes whatsoever. See Brown & Cohen, supra note 16, at 22.
Both Delaware and Missouri have general franchise statutes that presumably would apply
equally to motor vehicle franchises. Alaska, meanwhile, has legislation that deals with petroleum franchises. Id.
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proaches95 to the solution of manufacturer-dealer problems, using a
variety of provisions, many of which are used by several states.
1. Legislative Findings and Declarations
Many state regulatory schemes begin with a provision setting
forth either legislative findings or declarations of public policy."9
These provisions are included because state legislatures may not use
their powers to protect special groups from competition, and legislation that is not "affected with the public interest" is outside the
police power of the state.9 7 Thus, although legislatures have the
"authority under the police power to regulate the purchase and sale
of motor vehicles for the protection and general welfare of the public," they may not, "under the guise of regulation,. . . indulge in
arbitrary price fixing, the destruction of lawful competition, or the
creation of trade restraints tending to establish a monopoly." 8
The legislatures, in approaching this initial hurdle, have either
found or declared that the "distribution and sale" 9 of motor vehicles "vitally affects" the "general economy" of the particular state,
the "public interest," or the "public welfare."'' 0 Some stop there but
others add that the legislation is necessary to "avoid undue control
of the independent motor vehicle dealer"'"' by the manufacturer, to
95. The statutes generally can be classed as either one of two types: administrativelicensing, or penal. See S. MACAULAY, supra note 70, at 31-43.
96. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2302 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-101 (1978); GA.
CODE ANN. § 84-6602 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 437-1 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 190.015
(1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1251 (West 1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-53 (1972); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-1401.01 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-2 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-16-1 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §
561 (West Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 63, § 802 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-1 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1701 (1968); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4413 (36), § 1.02 (Vernon 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.005 (Supp. 1978);
W. VA. CODE § 47-17-1 (Supp. 1979).
97. See Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925).
98. Nelson v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939). Accord, Ohio Licensing Bd. v.
Memphis Auto Sales, 103 Ohio App. 347, 142 N.E.2d 268 (1957); Joyner v. Centre Motor Co.,
192 Va. 627, 66 S.E.2d 469 (1951).
99. Although it may be insignificant, several states do differ in their phraseology. Cf.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (1978) (only "distribution"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 561 (West
Supp.1979-1980) ("Distribution and sale of (new) motor vehicles") (emphasis added); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 802 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980) (distribution and sales); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-1 (1976) ("distribution, sale and servicing"). By contrast, Kentucky's
statute is merely to "provide for fair and impartial regulation." Ky. REV. STAT. § 190.015
(1970).
100. Although most states adopt these three phrases, at least one provides that it is
merely "affected with the public interest." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-1 (1976).
101. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2302 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1251 (West 1963);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-53 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 47-17-1 (Supp. 1979). Presumably, it is
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assure a "sound system of distribution to the public,"'' 0 2 or to assure

"compliance with manufacturer's warranties." ' 3 Three states focus

upon disruption of the dealer/customer relationship," 4 while one
merely states that it is "necessary to define the relationship and
responsibilities of the franchisors and franchisees."10 5 Not surprisingly, only one state seems concerned with the dealers' concomitant
duties or responsibilities.' °0
also for the protection of the dealer to "preserve the investments" of the citizens. See HAWAH
REV. STAT. § 437-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 561 (West Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 802 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.70.005 (Supp.
1978).
102. AnK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2302 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6602 (1979); HAWAI REV.
STAT. § 437-1 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1251 (West 1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-1753 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-1 (1978); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (36), § 1.02
(Vernon 1976).
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-1 (1978); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 4413 (36), § 1.02
(Vernon 1976).
104. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-6-101 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1401.01 (1978); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-1 (1976). These statutes seem to focus on the goodwill or consumer loyalty to a given dealer. In so doing, the South Dakota statute seems somewhat
contradictory because it provides that if a franchise is terminated for good cause, the manufacturer must open again in the same area. If this is the case, as long as there remains in the
area a franchise for the customers, of what importance is it to the public why a particular
dealer was terminated? This question is perhaps the most troublesome to proponents of these
statutes.
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-2 (West Supp. 1979-1980). At least the New Jersey legislature was consistent in applying its franchise law to all franchise relationships with little
special treatment for motor vehicles. Many states continue to regulate only the motor vehicle
franchise even though it would seem that the sale of "2 billion hamburgers" through franchises would also "affect the public interest." See generally FRANCHISING, supranote 1; Brown
& Cohen, supra note 16, at 22.
106. W. VA. CODE § 47-17-1 (Supp. 1979) states that one of its purposes is "to insure
that dealers fulfill their obligations under their franchises and provide adequate and sufficient
service to consumers generally." This one-sidedness in favor of the local dealers could be a
statute's undoing. Two principal attacks could be launched. One concerns the due process
limitation upon the power of the sovereign.
Insofar as this is concerned, [however] the police power is indeed extensive and indefinite in its scope. In particular, it may be exercised to promote the economic welfare of
the public (or of a particular group in need of relief from hardship or duress). Thus
minimum wage laws and price-fixing legislation are now recognized as valid from the
standpoint of due process.
United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). Although this
might seem to be a difficult test to meet when challenging motor vehicle franchise legislation,
one must ask whether the public is actually benefitted by these laws. One court, when
recently faced with such a challenge and the legislative declarations of fact and purpose,
stated that
(w]e are not . . . bound by the statements of public purpose found in the acts of the
legislature. "We do not think that the recitals contained in the act amount to finding of
fact, but are simply arguments presented by the General Assembly as to reasons why
they [sic] considered the act necessary, and their conclusions as to the effect of the act."
. . .It is the role of the judiciary to decide if the legislature has in fact acted within its
power. We conclude here, it has not.
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Challenges to legislation usually bypass the argument that a
statute is outside the police power of the state because the police
power is usually broadly construed. Commentators, however, have
long noted that state automobile franchise legislation may actually
General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 378, 237 S.E.2d 194, 197,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977).

A second attack can be made that the statutes unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Here the test is somewhat easier to meet since
a sharp distinction must be drawn when the validity of measures enacted by virtue of
the police power is being considered under the commerce clause. For purposes of the
commerce clause, genuine health, safety, or other scientifically justifiable regulations are
legitimate, and the court will regard their effect upon interstate commerce as remote or
incidental. But measures that are only ostensibly related to such objectives, and that
really are designed to promote the economic welfare or financial advantage of particular
groups or individuals, will be held unconstitutional. This is because such economic
legislation in fact amounts to a regulation of commerce, and with respect to interstate
commerce the Constitution has conferred upon the federal government, and not the
states, the power to make decisions and determine policy with regard to such matters.
If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze.
United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. at 464.
Courts have reached conflicting results with regard to this issue. Two courts have ruled
that various provisions of state motor vehicle franchise legislation violate the commerce
clause. General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 395 (D. Colo. 1956); General GMC
Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996
(1977). Then in what is probably the "in between" case, a Virginia district court ruled that
Virginia's restrictions upon franchise establishment violated the commerce clause, the same
finding that the Georgia court reached in General GMC Trucks. See American Motors Sales
Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 445 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd, 592 F.2d 219
(4th Cir. 1979). Aside from the Fourth Circuit's reversal, two other courts have held that a
particular state's restriction on franchise establishment did not violate the commerce clause.
See Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979);
Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 381 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1978). All three
latter courts were persuaded that the recent decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437
U.S. 117 (1978), precluded the commerce clause challenge. Exxon upheld a Maryland statute that forbade the major oil companies from owning and operating company-owned service
stations.
Several motor vehicle statutes have provisions like the Maryland statute that forbid
manufacturers to own or operate auto dealerships under certain circumstances, usually when
it would compete with an existing dealer. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1174(3)(K)
(Supp. 1979-1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, §§ 3, 4(k) (West 1972); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 482.36385(1) (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:4(Ill)(k) (Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-305.2 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-4(c)(10) (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 591714(c)(17) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4074(c)(8) (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 46.1547.2 (Supp. 1979). Although Exxon may support the validity of these laws, there seems to
be a clear distinction between whether a manufacturer can own a dealership and whether it
can open one that will be operated by a local businessman. Ownership restrictions such as
those upheld in Exxon do not burden interstate commerce or stifle competition as -do
establishment restrictions. The latter may also present particular burdens when the establishment has to be justified to a board composed of automobile dealers who may be adverse
to the manufacturer's wishes to open a new dealership irrespective of who owns it. For a
further discussion of the commerce clause as a viable argument against such legislation, see
note 150 infra and accompanying text.
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not be in the public interest and therefore may be invalid as a mere
attempt to protect dealers from competition." 7 Thus, as one recent
case makes clear, one should not overlook this possible line of attack."'08
2. Licensing
One means of controlling the manufacturer-dealer relationship
is through a requirement that those engaged in the automobile industry be licensed to do business within the state. These statutes 9
generally follow the pattern of the Wisconsin Act of 1937.110 Under-

standably, the primary sanction for wrongful conduct"' by a manufacturer in these states is revocation, suspension, or denial of his
license." 2
3.

Boards and Commissions

The state statutes are administered in a variety of ways. One
approach follows that of the early Wisconsin statute" 3 and utilizes
an "independent" state agency."' Several of these, however, use an
107. See, e.g., Brown & Conwill, Automobile Manufacturer-DealerLegislation, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 219, 237 (1957); Kessler, supra note 31, at 1189.
108. General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977).
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.01 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2305(1) (1979);
CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-6-108, 12-6-115 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-67a (West Supp.
1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.61 (West 1975); GA. Cone ANN. § 84-6605 (1979); HAWAii REv.
STAT. § 437-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 49-2401 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,§§ 5-101,
5-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (dealers only); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-2-2, 9-10-2-3 (Burns
Supp. 1979) (§ 9-10-2-2 as amended by Act of 1979, H. 1769, § 3, 1979 Ind. Legis. Serv. 9
(West)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2304 (Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. § 190.030 (Supp. 1970); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:1254(A)(1) (West 1963); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-202 (1977); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 63-17-73 (1972); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 51-602 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 60-1403.01 (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 196 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-287
(1978); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4517.02-.20, .99 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 564 (West Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 804 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 31-5-21 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1709 (Supp. 1979); Tex. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4413 (36), § 4.01-.07 (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-6 (1953); VA.
CODE § 46.1-523 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.021 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 218.01 (lb) (West Supp. 1979-1980). Some states purport to have some form of "merit"

regulation and require the manufacturer to file a copy of its standard franchise agreement
with a state authority. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-67a (West Supp. 1979); IND.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-2-3 (Burns Supp. 1979); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 51-604 (Supp. 1977).
110. See note 109 supra; S. MAcAuLAY, supra note 70, at 31-34.
111. Wrongful conduct includes wrongful termination, coercion, failure to deliver automobiles, price discrimination among dealers, and failure to pay warranty claims.

112. See notes 174-77 infra and accompanying text.
113. 1937 Wis. Laws, ch. 377, at 602, ch. 378, at 603, ch. 417, at 588, presently codified
as Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01 (West Supp. 1979-1980). See S. MAcAULAY, supra note 70, at 3132.
114. Cf. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1303 (1976) (assistant director of motor vehicles);
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"advisory board," usually made up of members of the industry,
primarily dealers. 1 5 Others, expanding on the "advisory board"
theme, administer the statutes through a commission, often appointed by some executive officer, that is composed of members of
the industry, usually dealers. This latter type statute may actually
mandate the presence of dealers" 6 or may be neutrally worded." 7
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-105 (1978) (executive director of the department of revenue administers licensing of manufacturers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-67a (West Supp. 1979) (commissioner of motor vehicles); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 320.60-.70 (West 1975) (repealed by 1976
Fla. Laws ch. 76-168, § 3 eff. July 1, 1980) (department of highway safety and motor vehicles);
IDAHO CODE § 49-2403 (Supp. 1979) (director of department of law enforcement-however,
decisions are made jointly by the director and the advisory board, id. § 49-2417); IND. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1979) (commissioner of motor vehicles); IOWA CODE ANN. §
322A.6 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (transportation regulation board); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2303
(1975) (director of vehicles-however, decisions may be set aside by dealer review board, id.
§ 8-2310(b)); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 190.020, 190.067 (1970) (bureau of vehicle regulation is
enforcement agency of the board, but board has no authority over manufacturers, id. §
190.041 (Supp. 1978)); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -119 (1977) (motor vehicle
administration); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-603 (Supp. 1977) (department of business
regulation); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-288, 20-301, 20-302 (1978) (commissioner of motor vehicles); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 31-5-1 to -12 (Supp. 1978) (registrar of motor vehicles); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-9 (1976) (department of public safety); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-8 (1953)
(motor vehicle business administrator); VA. CODE §§ 46.1-517 to -550.3 (1974) (commissioner);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218-01(la) (West Supp. 1979-1980) (state motor vehicle department).
115. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.694 (West 1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980) (3 dealers, 1
manufacturer, 2 "consumer" members, and the director of motor vehicles); IDAHO CODE § 492404 (Supp. 1979) (5 dealers); Irn. CODE ANN. § § 9-10-4-1 to -3 (Burns Supp. 1979) (2 dealers,
2 manufacturer representatives, 2 "consumer" members); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2311 (1975)
(4 dealers, 1 manufacturer representative, and 2 "consumer" members); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
20-305.4 (1978) (3 dealers and 3 "consumer" members); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-9 (1953) (5
members from the industry); VA. CODE § 46.1-550.2 (Supp. 1979) (3 dealers and 3
"nondealers"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(4) (1957) (9 members-no mandated composition).
116. The primary thesis of this Note is that these boards deny manufacturers an impartial tribunal in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Many of these statutes also mandate the presence of "consumer" members-those not
associated with any facet of the industry. Cf. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3000,3001 (West Supp. 1979)
(4 dealers, 5 "consumer" members); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-103 (1978) (7 dealers, 2
"consumer" members-only administer dealer licensing); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6604 (1979) (5
dealers, 4 nondealers); Ky. REV. STAT. § 190.061 (1970) (commissioner and 8 dealers-no
control over manufacturers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1402 (1978) (director of motor vehicles, 5
auto dealers, 1 truck dealer, 1 motorcycle dealer, 1 factory representative, and 1 "consumer"
member); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.30 (Page Supp. 1978) (registrar of motor vehicles, 5
dealers, 2 lessors, 1 "consumer" member); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 803 (Purdon Supp. 19791980) (6 dealers, 1 salesman, 3 "consumer" members); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5-2 (1968) (7
dealers, 2 "consumer" members); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), §§ 2.01-.10 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (5 dealers, 4 "consumer" members).
117. Cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2304 (1979) (5 "licensees," 2 "consumer" members);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 437-5 (1976) (3 shall be engaged in the motor vehicle industry and 4 shall
be private citizens not connected with the industry); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1253 (West
1963 & Supp. 1979) (9 members who shall be "actually engaged in the manufacture, distribution or sale of motor vehicles in the state. . for. . .five. . .years"); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
63-17-57, 63-17-59 (1972) (6 "licensees," 2 "consumer" members); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 563 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (7 members who shall be engaged in the manufacture, distri-
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Rarely, however, is there the mandated presence of a manufacturer,"18 and manufacturers generally receive little consideration for
membership on these agencies.' Meanwhile, the statutes that may
be classified as primarily "penal" generally leave enforcement of the
statutes to local law enforcement agencies and the courts, using
2
fines rather than licensing as the primary sanction. 1
4.

Restrictions on Franchise Termination

Perhaps the most salient feature of the state legislation is its
attempt to restrict the termination of the relationship between the
manufacturer and the dealer. 2 ' In this area, the states enunciate the
restriction in one of two ways. Several states totally forbid termination by the manufacturer 2 1 unless the applicable standard 2" is met.
bution, or sale of motor vehicles within the state for not less than 10 years); TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 59-1703 (Supp. 1979) (9 members who "shall have been actually engaged in the manufacture, distribution, or sale of motor vehicles in this state for not less than five (5) . . .years
and 2 'consumer' members").
118. Only Nebraska requires representation of the manufacturer or "factory." See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 60-1402 (1978) (one out of nine board members.)
119. Even with the statutes with a "neutral" wording, see note 117 supra, "[iun effect,
a group of established automobile dealers sits in judgment on other dealers and on manufacturers and their representatives rather than an independent state agency. . . .Clearly,
[these] Commission[s] will have a certain type of expertise." S. MAcAuLAY, supra note 70,
at 33, Professor MacAulay's statement is certainly correct. For example, the Tennessee statute requires the board to be composed of those engaged in "manufacture, distribution, or
sale" of automobiles as well as two "consumer" members, but the Tennessee Motor Vehicle
Commission is composed of two "consumer" members and nine automobile dealersas of the
date of this Note.
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 2 (West 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
445.521-.534 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.15-.24 (West 1966); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 482.36411 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:16 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:1010 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-13 (1978); N.Y. GEN.Bus. LAW § 198
(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01.1 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 5615-20 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4072 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46-70.190
(Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-17-3, 47-17-6 (SupP. 1979).
121. In fact, this is listed as one of the "public purposes" for much of the state legislation. See notes 101-04 supra and accompanying text.
122. AnzZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 1979-1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 752305(A)(4)(c) (1979); CAL. VEH. CODE § 3060 (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-120
(1)(d) (1978); IDAHO CODE § 49-2414(7)(f) (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-3-5 (Bums
Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A.2 (West Supp. 1979-1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
32:1254(A)(4)(c) (West Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1174(3)(C), 1179 (Supp.
1979-1980); MD. TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 15-209 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(e)
(West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.522 (Supp. 1979-1980); MIsS. CODE ANN. §
63-17-73(1)(d)(3) (1972); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 51-605(1) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 60-1420 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.3636 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357-B:4 (III)
(c), 357-B:9 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 57-16-5(F), 57-16-9 (1978); N.Y. GN. Bus. LAW §§ 197, 197-a (McKinney Supp. 19791980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01.1 (Supp. 1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 565(j)(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980); S.C. CODE 56-15-40(3)(c) (1976); S.D.
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Others use wrongful termination as grounds for revocation or suspension of the manufacturer's license.'
The standards for termination vary widely among the states.
The more commonly used standard prevents the manufacturer from
terminating a franchise except for "cause,"Ir2 which may be expressed as "good" cause,'26 "due" cause, 2 ' or "just" cause. 12 Others,
9
following the example of the federal statute, use "good faith."''
Meanwhile, several states employ an amorphous standard that prohibits a manufacturer from cancelling a franchise "unfairly, without
due regard to the equities of said dealer and without just provocation."' A small number of states either specifically enumerate what
CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 32-6A-5 (1976); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-23(C)(6) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§
4074(C)(3), 4079 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 46.1-547(e) (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.70.180(10)(b) (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 47-17-5(a) (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
218.01(3)(a)(17) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
123. See notes 125-32 infra and accompanying text.
124. Several of the statutes cited in note 122 supra are examples of "unfair" or

"prohibited" practices that are grounds for revocation of licenses. The following statutes,
however, specifically classify wrongful termination as a ground for revocation or suspension
of a license. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(8) (West 1975)(repealed eff. July 1, 1980); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 84-6610(C)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1979); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 437-28(b)(22)(C) (1976); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-2308(a)(13)(ii) (1975); Ky. RE. STAT. § 190.040(1)(o) (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 805(2)(xi) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-5-23(8) (1968); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)(3) (Supp. 1979).
125. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-605(1) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 197
(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
126. ARIZ. RE. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. VEH. CODE § 3060
(West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-6610(C)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §
322A.2 (West Supp. 1979-1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.ch. 93B, § 4(3)(e) (West Supp. 1979);
MICH. Comp.LAws ANN. § 445.522 (Supp. 1979-1980); NEB.REy. STAT. § 60-1420 (1978); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 482.3636 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-305(6) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01.1 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFED LAws
ANN. § 32-6A-5 (1976); TEx. RE. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(3) (Vernon Supp.
1980); VA. CODE § 46.1-547(e) (Supp. 1979).
127. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2305(a)(4)(c) (1979); ME. RE. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§
1174(3)(c), 1179 (Supp. 1979-1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-73(1)(d)(3) (1972); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 357-B:4(mH)(c), 357-B:9 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-5(F) (1978);
S.C. CODE § 56-15-40(3)(c) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4074(c)(3), 4079 (Supp. 1979).
128. COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-6-120(1)(d) (1978); W. VA. CODE § 47-17-5(a) (Supp. 1979).
129. See Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976), discussed in notes 70-93 supra and accompanying text; HAwAI RaV. STAT. § 437-28(b)(22)(C)
(1976); N.Y. GEN.Bus. LAW § 197-a (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (after Sept. 1, 1970); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.180(10)(b) (Supp. 1978).
130. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(8) (West 1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); IDAHO CODE
§ 49-2414(7)(f) (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2308(a)(13)(ii) (1975); KY. REV. STAT. §
190.040(1)(o) (Supp. 1978); LA. Rv.STAT. ANN. § 32:1254(a)(4)(c) (West Supp. 1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 565(j)(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 805(2)(xi)
(Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5-23(8) (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 591714(c)(3) (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-23(c)(6) (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
218.01(3)(a)(17) (West Supp. 1979-1980). For problems in the use of this standard, see note
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3' or further blur the
they consider to be more objective 3standards'
2

standard with a mixture of terms.'

Some legislatures, apparently realizing the problems' 33 inherent
in their standard, enumerate factors to be considered when determining whether the state's particular standard for termination is
met.' 3 Some also specify factors that do not satisfy that state's
133 infra. Also, recall that Congress rejected similar language in drafting the Automobile
Dealers' Day In Court Act. See note 78 supra.
131. Cf. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-209 (1977) (Dealer must fail to substantially
comply with the reasonable requirements of the franchise); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.522
(Supp. 1979-1980) (must "act with good cause and in accordance with reasonable standards
of fair dealing"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West Supp. 1979-1980) ("good cause" is limited
to one situation-failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the franchise);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01.1 (Supp. 1979) ("good cause" is again limited to one situation-failure to comply with the requirements of the franchise); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §
46.70.180(10)(b) (Supp. 1978) (must "fairly compensate the dealer at fair going business
value").
132. Idaho, for example, employs the "unfairly without due regard" standard, see note
130 supra and accompanying text, yet enumerates factors to determine whether "good cause"
is established. IDAHO CODE § 49-2414(7)(f) (Supp. 1979). Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01.1
(Supp. 1979) (determination of "good cause" must be made in "good faith"); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 565(j)(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980) ("unfairly and without just provocation or
without due regard to the equities of the dealer or without good faith") (emphasis added);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.180(10)(b) (Supp. 1978) ("without fairly compensating the
dealer at fair going business value" if the termination was not in "good faith").
133. This legislation, commonly referred to as "good cause" legislation, is subject to a
host of constitutional challenges, including arguments that it is "vague and uncertain," that
it violates the commerce and due process clauses, and that it is preempted through operation
of the supremacy clause. Although these particular challenges are beyond the scope of this
Note, a litigator in this area could and should argue many of these concepts. See, e.g., Brown
& Cohen, supra note 16; Brown & Conwill, supra note 107; Kessler, supra note 31; Note,
ConstitutionalObstacles to State "Good Cause" Restrictions On FranchiseTerminations,74
COLUM. L. REV. 1487 (1974); Comment, PublicInterest and the Iowa Motor Vehicle Franchisers Act, 56 IowA L. REV. 1060 (1971); Comment, The Automobile DealerFranchiseAct of
1956-An Evaluation, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 711 (1963); Comment, The Judicial Treatment of the
Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 62 MICH. L. REV. 310 (1963); Comment, supra note 40.
134. These factors include such things as the amount of the business transacted by the
franchisee, the investment necessarily made, obligations incurred by the franchisee in the
performance of his part of the franchise, the permanency of the investment, whether termination is injurious to the public welfare, the franchisee's ability to serve customers, whether
the franchisee has refused to honor the franchisor's warranties, whether the franchisee has
failed to substantially comply with the terms of the franchise, and whether there has been
bad faith on the part of the franchisee. See AiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 19791980); CAL. VEH. CODE § 3061 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6610(c)(4) (Supp.
1979); IDAHO CODE § 49-2414(7)(f) (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A.15 (West Supp.
1979-1980); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(e) (West Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 51-605(15) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-1433 (1978); NEV. REv. STAT. § 482.3636
(1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-6 (1976). Michigan has a more exhaustive list that
is more manufacturer-oriented. It incldes such factors as whether the dealer has made a
material misrepresentation to the manufacturer or whether the dealer has been convicted of
a crime. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.522 (Supp. 1979-1980).
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standard' 35 for termination.1 3

5. Restrictions on Franchise Establishment
Many states, in what is sometimes an open admission of an
underlying rationale of economic protectionism, 3 regulate the establishment as well as the termination of franchises. As with franchise termination,
states utilize a variety of standards including
1 38
"good" cause,

"in the public interest,1 '

39

or for "public conveni-

necessity." 4 '

Others focus upon such items as "the releence and
vant market area," the "adequacy of service of existing dealers,"
and the "propriety of granting additional franchises."' Still other
states, without attempting to hide their protectionist motives, ask
whether the establishment of a new dealership "would be inequitable to the existing dealer."'4 Several states also enumerate factors
135. Factors that do not meet the requisite standard typically include a mere change
in ownership of the dealership and a dealer's refusal of any vehicle or part not orderd by the
dealer. See AIz. RE. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 1979-1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A.11
(West Supp. 1979-1980); NEB. RED. STAT. § 60-1429 (1978); S.D. CODnuIaD LAWS ANN. § 326A-5 (1976).
136. Do state termination provisions that require a manufacturer to show good cause,
due cause, etc., directly conflict with the Federal Act that requires only good faith and are
they therefore preempted under 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (1976)? See note 93 supra and accompanying text. Are they preempted under the antitrust laws or under the commerce clause? See
generally L. TRmE, AmEmcAN CONSTrrurONAL LAW 376-84 (1978); Brown & Cohen, supra note

16, at 44-51, 56-58; Note, supra note 133, at 1499-1506.
137. See note 142 infra and accompanying text.
138. Aruz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. VEH. CODE § 3062
(West Supp. 1979); GA. ConE ANN. § 84-6610(C)(5) (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A.4
(West Supp. 1979-1980); MONT. RE. CODES ANN. § 51-605(2) (Supp. 1977); NE. RE. STAT.
§ 60-1422 (1978); Nav. RE. STAT. § 482.36365 (1977); Tax. Rav. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36),
§ 4.06(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
139. These two statutes, however, also require "good cause." See MoNT. RE. CODES
ANN. § 51-605(2) (Supp. 1977); Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 4.06(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1980).
140. S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-3 (1976). South Dakota, however, enumerates
factors that either do or do not establish "good cause." See id. § 32-6A-4.
141. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:4 (I1) (1) (Supp. 1977) (with the relevant market
area to be determined solely by "equitable principles"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-4(C)(11)
(Supp. 1978) (also with reference to "equitable principles"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)
(20) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4074(c)(8), (9) (Supp. 1979).
142. These statues, however, graciously provide that "the sales and needs of the public
shall be given due consideration." (emphasis added). If the legislation is truly in the public
interest, should this not be the primary consideration? See note 106 supra; COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 12-6-120(1)(h) (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-5(p) (1978). Cf. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4413(36), § 4.06(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (In determining "good cause" and "public
interest," the Commission shall consider the desirability of a competitive market place). See
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(9) (West 1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980) (cannot enter agreement with franchisee with inadequate facilities); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3) (1)
(West Supp. 1979) (may not be "arbitrary" or without notice to existing franchisees); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1978) (a new franchise will not be permitted if there is "reasonable

19801

FRANCHISE A CTS

that are considered grounds for establishment of new franchises, as
well as those that are not.'
The United States Supreme Court considered the validity of
restrictions upon motor vehicle franchise establishment in New
Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. IThe manufacturer challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that required the
manufacturer to secure the approval of the Board before opening a
new franchise within the market area of an existing dealer. Such
approval was not required, however, if the existing dealer did not
protest. A federal district court declared the statute unconstitutional. 4 5
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Brennan.
The Court, assuming a protected interest,' first held that the statevidence that. . . the market will not support all of the dealerships.
VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (Supp. 1979) (same as North Carolina).

. .

in the trade area");

143. Among those factors are the amount of business conducted by other franchisees of
the same line-make in the community, the investment necessarily made and the obligations
incurred by other franchisees in the area in performing their franchises, whether other franchises are providing adequate service, the permanency of the investment, the effect upon the
motor vehicle business and the consuming public in the relevant market area, whether it
would be injurious to public welfare, and whether it would increase competition and therefore
be in the public interest. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.02 (Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 3063 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6610(c)(5)(F) (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 322A.16 (West Supp. 1979-1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(1) (West
Supp. 1979); MONT.REV. CODES ANN. § 51-605(16) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1434
(1978); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 482.36365 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-4 (1976).
Interestingly, the Nevada statute is the only one that states explicitly what should be the
real purpose of these laws-to prevent coercion by the manufacturer, for which the dealer
could sue under the Federal Good Faith Act. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
9 (1956) ("would not prohibit a manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in a
community provided that the establishment of the new dealer is not a device to coerce or
intimadate an existing dealer") (emphasis added). Three states also list factors that do
not constitute grounds for the establishment of a new dealership including the mere desire
for further market penetration, a change in ownership of an existing franchisee, and nonacceptance by existing dealers of unordered parts or vehicles. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 322A.11
(West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-5(p) (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
32-6A-7 (1976).
144. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
145. The California act was declared unconstitutional by a three judge district court,
which held that the absence of a prior hearing on the merits of a protest prior to sending
notification to the manufacturer denied manufacturers and their proposed franchisees the
procedural due process mandated by the fourteenth amendment. Orrin W. Fox Co. v. New
Motor Vehicle Bd., 440 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
146. There was disagreement among the court concerning whether there actually was a
"liberty" interest. Two of the concurring justices did not find a liberty interest, viewing the
case as one of substantive due process. Thus, they disposed of it under the general "hands
off" approach to economic legislation exemplified by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963). 439 U.S. at 114 (Blackmun, J., concurring). If this is the proper approach (and this
author believes that it is) what would have been the Court's reaction to the same procedure
had the California system been overseen by a board of automobile dealers? Would this have
then denied the manufacturers substantive due process? California had only shortly
beforehand struck down the composition of its all-dealer board as violative of due process
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ute did not deny the manufacturer due process of law because such
interests may always be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed
by a "general scheme of business regulation."'47 The Court then'4'
rejected the claims that the statute conflicted with the Sherman
Act, holding that it fell within the "state action" exception.' 4 Curiously absent from the Court's opinion, however, was any mention
of whether the statute burdened interstate commerce. With three
cases recently reaching conflicting results on this issue,'50 it appears
that the commerce clause may be one of the few remaining viable
challenges'51 to provisions that restrict franchise establishment after
Orrin W. Fox.
in American Motors Sales Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 69 Cal. App. 3d 983, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977). See notes 253-61 infra and accompanying text.
147. 439 U.S. at 106.
148. Before reaching the antitrust issues, the Court quickly disposed of the argument
that the act impermissibly delegated state power to private citizens, stating that "[an
otherwise valid regulation is not rendered invalid simply because those whom the regulation
is designed to safeguard may elect to forego its protection." Id. at 108-09. What result when
the private citizens actually control the system through delegation of power? For a discussion
of the delegation doctrine as it pertains to statutes "regulating" warranty rate reimbursement, see note 169 infra.
149. 439 U.S. at 109-11. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943). Inherent in the Parker doctrine, however, is the distinction between a state statute
that is merely permissive of private anticompetitive conduct and one that actually substitutes
a policy of governmental regulation for the free market policies of the federal antitrust laws.
The former would be preempted by the Sherman Act's prohibition of private anticompetitive
behavior. Thus, states are not free to merely authorize anticompetitive conduct or to disregard the antitrust laws in pursuit of purely commercial objectives. See generally Davidson &
Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended ConstitutionalLimits on the Federal Interdictionof
Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VmD. L. Rzv. 575 (1978). See also L. TRmE, supranote 136,
at 30-31 (Supp. 1979) (suggesting an erosion of the Parkerrationale). Recall these basics
during the discussion of warranty rate reimbursement at text accompanying notes 159-173
infra. Also, if a state board is composed of automobile dealers who make decisions on establishment, could there not be a possible antitrust violation? See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distilleries, 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972) (suggesting that dealers who pressed sham protests for the sole reason of
delaying the establishment of competing dealerships may be vulnerable to suits under the
antitrust laws).
150. Compare Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 135 (1979) and Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 381 N.E.2d 908
(Mass. 1978) with American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 445 F. Supp.
902 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979) and General GMC Trucks, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977).
151. For a partial discussion of the commerce clause challenge, see note 106 supra which
notes that several recent cases view the Court's decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.
as controlling on this issue. Upholding Maryland's prohibition against oil companies' ownership of service stations, the Exxon court stated:
[W]e do not find that the Commerce Clause, by its own force, pre-empts the field . ..
[T]he Commerce Clause itself pre-empts an entire field from state regulation, and then
only when a lack of national uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods.
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6. Prohibitions on Coercion and Price Discrimination
It is undoubtedly clear at this point that a central concern for
dealers has always been a fear of coercion by the manufacturer,
which can take a variety of forms. Traditionally, a major topic has
been the "forcing" of unordered vehicles and parts upon the dealers.
Often accompanying such practices were threats of termination,
failure to deliver promptly or in proper quantity the automobiles
that the dealer actually did order, and threats to open "stimulator"
dealers.
Although these practices are substantially covered by the Fed[citations omitted] The evil [here] is not that the several States will enact differing

regulations, but rather that they will all conclude that divestiture provisions are warranted. The problem thus is not one of national uniformity. In the absence of a relevant
congressional declaration of policy, or a showing of a specific discrimination against, or
burdening of, interstate commerce, we cannot conclude that the States are without
power to regulate in this area.
437 U.S. at 128-29 (emphasis added). Does this remark apply equally to automobile franchise
establishment? As the House report on the Dealer's Day In Court Act emphasized:
the bill does not afford the dealer the right to be free from competition from additional
franchise dealers. Appointment of added dealers in an area is a normal competitive
method for securing better distributionand curtailmentof this right would be inconsistent with the antitrust objectives of this legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1956) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress has
addressed the "problem" of franchise establishment, indicating unequivocally that it did not
want to prevent good faith appointments of additional franchises. Moreover, the "problems"
of franchise establishment are not of peculiarly local concern. See id. at 3. ("collectively the
automobile-dealer group is of great importance to the [national] economy"). Therefore, any
problems caused by "destructive" competition in this nationwide industry are problems to
be addressed by Congress. See, e.g., Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
Although the commerce clause argument was absent from the Orrin W. Fox opinion, an
examination of the record discloses that it was briefed by both sides and that the Court was
aware of it early in the case. See Appellee's Motion to Affirm at 10 n.5; Brief of Appellees at
53-5 n.43, New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). Moreover, the
primary case relied upon by appellants was Exxon v. Governor of Md. New Motor Vehicle
Board's reply brief at 22-23 n.16; Northern California Motor Car Dealers Ass'n's reply brief
at 23-30; Brief of amicus curiae at 17-28. Thus, the issue was squarely presented to the Court
and its failure to resolve the issue allowed the courts to reach a possibly incorrect result in
reliance upon Exxon. See American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592
F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979), revog 445 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Va. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor
Vehicle Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v.
Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 381 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1978). The Court's action is particularly
perplexing in view of its resolution of the antitrust challenge, to which it replied, "[t]he
District Court did not pass upon this contention. We choose to address it because the underlying facts are disputed and the question presented is purely one of law." 439 U.S. at 109 n.13.
Does this not also apply to the commerce clause challenge? In view of the Court's action in
Orrin W. Fox and the denial of certiorari in General GMC Trucks, one can only conclude that
the commerce clause remains a viable challenge to state motor vehicle franchise provisions.
Furthermore, if establishment restrictions are overly concerned with the needs of existing
dealers rather than with the needs of the public, the argument could be made that the
legislation is not proper under the police power. See note 106 supra. See also Comment, supra
note 133.
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eral Good Faith Act,'52 the states have nevertheless hastened to
attempt to stamp them out. Many states characterize coercion generally as an unfair practice or as a ground for revocation or suspension of the manufacturer's license and provide that a manufacturer
"shall not coerce or attempt to coerce any . . . dealer to accept
delivery of any . . . vehicles, parts or accessories therefor or any

other commodities which have not been ordered by such dealer."' 53
Apart from the "forcing" problem, the states also seek to expand the
dealer's protection from other forms of coercion. Thus, many generally provide that a manufacturer shall not attempt "to coerce any
• . . dealer to enter into agreement with such manufacturer.

. .

or

do any other act unfair to such dealer by threatening to cancel or
not renew any franchise.
..."I
Furthermore, legislatures,
realizing that a dealer is at the
152. See generally note 81 supra and accompanying text.
153. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1323.01(A) (1976). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 752305(3)(a) (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-120(c) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(5) (West
1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 437-28(b)(22)(F) (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 49-2414(7)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-3-2(2) (Bums Supp. 1979); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-2308(a)(13)(i) (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. 190.040(1)(m) (Supp. 1978); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1254(A)(3)(a)-:1254(A)(3)(c) (West 1963); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1174(2) (Supp. 1979-1980); MD. TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 15-207(b)(2) (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.527 (Supp. 1979-1980); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 51-606(1) (Supp. 1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 482.36391 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:4(]I) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 57-16-5(A)-(C) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(1) (1978); OKLIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 565(i), 571(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5-23(5), -5.1-4(B) (1968 &
Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 56-15-40(2) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)(22) (Supp. 1979);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
41-3-23(c)(1) to -23(c)(3) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4074(b) (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE §
46.1-547(a) (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.180(10)(a) (Supp. 1978); W. VA.
CODE § 47-17-5(j) (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(3)(a)(15) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
154. AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1323.01(B) (1976). Similarly vague standards also forbid the manufacturer to act in a manner "prejudicial," "financially detrimental," or "without
due regard to the equities of the dealer." See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2305(A)(4)(b) (1979);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-120(b) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 320.64(6)-.64(7) (West 1975)
(repealed eff. July 1, 1980). Some also prohibit manufacturer's threats to open a competing
dealership. E.g., HAWAI REV. STAT. § 437-28(b)(22)(A) (1976). See also IDAHO CODE § 492414(7)(d) (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2308(a)(13)(iii) (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. §
190.040(1)(n) (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1254(A)(4)(b) (West 1963); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1174(3)(B) (Supp. 1979-1980); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-207(b)(1)
(1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(d) (Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-1773(1)(d)(2) (1972); MoNT. RE. CODES ANN. § 51-606(2) (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 357-B:4(Il)(b) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-5(E) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20305(2) (1978); OKuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 565(j)(2)-565(j)(3), 569(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5-23(6) to 23(7), 31-5.1-4(C)(2) (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 56-15.
40(3)(b) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)(21) (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-323(c)(4) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4074(c)(2) (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 46.1-547(b)
(Supp. 1979); WASH. RE. CODE ANN. § 46.70.180(10)(d) (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 47-175(j) (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 218.01(3)(a)(16), 218.01(7) (West 1957 & Supp. 19791980).
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mercy of the manufacturer for his supply of automobiles, also seek
to prevent a possible source of coercion by requiring the manufacturer to deliver automobiles in reasonable quantities and within a
reasonable time. 5 5 Some provide for strict time periods, while others
mercifully excuse the manufacturer for delays that are truly beyond
its control.'5 Meanwhile, several states attempt to prevent coercion
by means of price discrimination, either among dealers or between
dealers and third parties'57 or through discrimination among dealers
with regard to warranty reimbursement. '
7.

Warranty Rate Reimbursement Provisions

States often provide for a system of warranty rate reimbursement under which dealers are paid for the work performed in honoring the manufacturer's warranties. The ostensible purpose for these
provisions is to encourage the dealer to give the customer-public
adequate service by guaranteeing him fair compensation. 59' Some of
the statutes, when examined, may actually lead to a much less
desirable result.
Warranty provisions also have a wide variety of terms. Some
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2305(A)(4)(a) (1979); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-6-120(e) (1978);
§ 320.64(12) (West 1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); HAwA REv. STAT. §
437-28(b)(22)(D) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 49-2414(7)(e) (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82308(a)(15) (1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:1254(A)(4)(a) (West 1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1174(3)(A) (Supp. 1979-1980); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-208 (1977); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(c) (Supp. 1979); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.527, 445.529
(Supp. 1979-1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-73(1)(d)(1) (1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357B:4(l1I) (a) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-5(D) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§
565(j)(1), 571(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 805(2)(xiv)(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-4(C)(1) (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 56-15-40(3)(a)
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)(1) (Supp. 1979); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4413(36), § 5.02(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-23(c)(5) (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 4074(c)(1) (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 46.1-547(g) (Supp. 1979); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 46.70.180(10)(e) (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-17-5(f) to -5(g) (Supp. 1979).
156. States usually allow for an Act of God, a strike, an embargo, or some other cause
over which the manufacturer has no control. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-73(1)(d)(1) (1972);
S.C. CODE § 56-15-40(3)(a) (1976). On the other hand several provide for an absolute period
of time, usually 60 days. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)(1) (Supp. 1979).
157. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2305(A)(4)(e) to -2305(A)(4)(g) (1979); HAWAn REv. STAT.
§ 437-28(b)(22)(E) (Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1174(3)(E)-1174(3)(G)
(Supp. 1979-1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, §§ 4(3)(f)-4(3)(h) (West Supp. 1979);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 63-17-73(1)(d)(5) to -73(1)(d)(7) (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357B:4(II)(e)-:4(M)(g) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-16-5(H) to -5(J) (1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 31-5.1-4(C)(5) to -4(c)(6) (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE §§ 56-15-40(3)(e) to -40(3)(g)
(1976); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-14 (1976).
158. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 482.36385(2) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c)(18)
(Supp. 1979).
159. See Brief for Volkswagen, Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Vaughn Motor Co., No.
0960-6-18-79 (Tenn. Motor Vehicle Comm'n 1979) (copy on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
155.

FLA. STAT. ANN.
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require that the dealer be compensated "adequately and fairly"'' 0
while others require that he be compensated
for warranty work,
"reasonably"'' 61 or "fairly."'6 2 Another employs the now familiar
"unfairly and without due regard to the equities"' 63 language to
determine the appropriate rate. Meanwhile, two states apparently
rely upon the bargaining process between the manufacturer and the
dealer to establish the rate.'64
In attempting to oversee the fairness of warranty rate reimbursement, several states initially require that the manufacturer file
with the appropriate authority a schedule of compensation'65 showing the time allowances and rates for certain work. Others enumerate factors to be considered by the governing authority in reaching
160. ALA. CODE § 32-17-1 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2306(A)(10) (1979); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 3065 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6610(c)(6) (Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1176 (Supp. 1979-1980); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 6 (West 1972); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 63-17-85(0) (Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:6 (Supp. 1977); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-16-7 (1978); S.C. CODE § 56-15-60 (1976); Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4413(36), § 5.02(9) (Vernon Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4076 (Supp. 1979).
161. Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.01(E) (Supp. 1979-1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 126-114 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.696 (repealed eff. July 1, 1980) (West 1975); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 5-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2308(a)(14) (1975);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 190.046 (Supp. 1978); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-212 (1977); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 445.530 (Supp. 1979-1980); N.C. GEN. STAT § 20-305.1 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 63, § 805(2)(xiv)(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); VA. CODE § 46.1-547.1 (Supp. 1979); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 218.01(3)(a)(22) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
162. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-3-2(8) (Burns Supp. 1979); Nav. REv. STAT. § 482.36385(3)
(1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-6 (Supp. 1978).
163. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2306(A)(10) (1979) provides that a manufacturer shall not
"unfairly and without due regard to the equities of the parties or to the detriment of the public
welfare [fail] to fulfill any warranty agreement or . . . adequately and fairly compensate
any of its motor vehicle dealers." Prior to 1977, Tennessee had an identical provision. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(h)(7) (1968) (repealed 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 162, § 24). Under
such a provision, if the manufacturer fulfills an agreement, does the reimbursement still have
to meet the "adequate and fair" test? Does the language make the provision unconstitutionally vague, particularly in states in which there are criminal penalties? See General
Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956).
164. Iowa requires the manufacturer to "fulfill the terms" of the warranty agreement.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A(5) (West Supp. 1979-1980). Meanwhile, West Virginia seems to have
the fairest method of setting warranty reimbursement. Under that statute, the rate shall be
mutually agreed upon by the dealer and manufacturer. If they are unable to agree, the rate
is then determined by the courts. See W. VA. CODE § 47-17-10 (Supp. 1979). It has been
suggested that the primary function of these statutes should be to encourage parties to agree
without burdening the courts. See Note, StatutoryRegulation of Manufacturer-DealerRelationships in the Automobile Industry, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1256 (1957).
165. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1304.01(E) (Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. VEt. CODE § 3065
(West Supp. 1979); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-6-114 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-67a (West
Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6610(c) (6) (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 49-2420 (Supp. 1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,§ 5-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KY. REv. STAT. § 190.0462 (Supp.
1978). In what is perhaps one of the most egregious examples of favoring the dealer, Tennessee
allows the dealer to file what he will charge; thus, the reimbursement rate is set unilaterally
by the dealer. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1722 (Supp. 1979).
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its decision on the reasonableness of a reimbursement rate.'6 One
factor, focused upon by a substantial number of states, is the labor
rate that the dealer normally charges his nonwarranty, or retail,
customers. Many allow this to be merely a factor,'67 but some have
provisions that forbid the manufacturer to "pay to its dealers a labor
rate per hour for warranty repairs or servicing less than the dealer's
retail labor rate for similar repairs."' 68 Thus, the dealer's rate under
such provisions is basically whatever the dealer unilaterally determines it to be. Besides presenting unique constitutional problems'69
166. Among the factors usually listed are the effective labor rate charged by the dealer
to its regular retail customers, the compensation rate for other dealers, the prevailing wage
rate being paid by the dealers, the time required, and the compensation paid by other
manufacturers. Veh. Code § 3065 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.696 (West 1975)
(repealed eff. July 1, 1980); GA. CODE ANN.§ 84-6610(c)(6) (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
8-2317(b) (1975); Ky. REv. STAT. § 190.046 (Supp. 1978); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-212(b)
(1977); NEv. REv. STAT. § 482.36385(3) (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305.1(a) (1978); VA. CODE
§ 46.1-547.1(a) (Supp. 1979). In Virginia, at least, the list of factors seems to be superfluous
since the statute also provides that the compensation may not be less than that charged retail
customers.
167. See generally note 166 supra.
168. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1722 (Supp. 1979). The statutes may also be couched in
equally effective terms such as "equal to." See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-17-1 (1975); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 75-2306(A)(10) (1979); IDAHO CODE § 49-2420 (Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 190.046(2)
(Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-85j) (Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51604(5) (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:9-a(H)(a) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:10-15(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); TEx. REv. Cmv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(9)
(Vernon Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4076(b) (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 46.1-547.1(a)
(Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(3)(a)(22) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
169. Statutes that unilaterally allow dealers to set reimbursement rates seemingly constitute an unconstitutional delegation of authority to private individuals. As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, in which the Court
declared the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional, "[w]ould it be seriously
contended that Congress would delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficient
for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?" 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
Of particular relevance is Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 410, 188 N.W. 487 (1922),
in which a city ordinance provided that the prevailing wage to be paid to employees of
contractors performing work for the city would be determined "by the wage paid to members
of any regular and recognized organization of such skilled laborers for such skilled labor." The
regulation was held invalid as an improper delegation to unions of the power to determine
and fix the prevailing wage scale. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). If
mere proposals are submitted for approval by an agency, no unconstitutional delegation
occurs, but a higher standard of protection is required for the other party than minimal due
process. See Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Insurance Dep't, 471 Pa. 437, 370 A.2d 685
(1977). With regard to motor vehicle warranty reimbursement, however, no agency action is
required by the literal wording of the statute. Even if agency action was required, what about
the situations in which the agency is composed of auto dealers? It is certainly doubtful that
this would meet the requisite "higher standard of protection" since dealers have an interest
in seeing reimbursement rates rise.
This argument regarding warranty rate reimbursement has not yet appeared in any
reported decision but the argument was presented in an unreported Tennessee case. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Comm'n, Davidson Equity No. A-7901-I
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these provisions present a practical dilemma-undue emphasis
upon the retail rate regularly charged may actually have a harmful
rather than a helpful effect upon the public. This result is compelled
if the dealer can unilaterally set the rate with no reference to mechanics' wages. The dealer may pay low wages, which may lead to
low skill or undermotivated mechanics who in turn provide poor
customer service. 7 0 At the same time, however, he may raise his
"posted" retail rate in order to cover other business costs.' 7' Thus,
the manufacturer could be forced to reimburse the dealer at a high
cost without receiving its money's worth in terms of service to the
public. Furthermore, every dealer might have a different rate, causing the manufacturer overwhelming burdens in studying each individual dealer. 72 The combination of these factors strongly suggests
(Tenn. App. Sept. 8, 1978). When the Court of Appeals was notified that such provisions allow
the dealer to unilaterally set the rate of compensation, the court astutely replied that "[t]he
Court recognizes that on its face this may appear to be somewhat unusual but it is, after all,
the mandate of the legislature. The dealer unilaterally decides what he will charge his other
retail customers." Id. at 4-5 (A copy of this opinion is on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review
together with the briefs of the parties). This view, coupled with the fact that that warranty
work comprised only 10% of the dealer's repair work, led the court to conclude that there was
no unconstitutional delegation. The court cited no authority for its position nor did it seek
to distinguish those cases cited to it. Even a cursory examination of the statutes and the
relevant case law suggests that the court is in error and has bent double in order to accommodate the dealers' interests. See also note 170 infra. The statutes may also pose interesting
antitrust problems. While the primary argument on the other side would be that they are
"state action" and thus outside the purview of the antitrust laws, do these statutes not merely
authorize private anticompetitive conduct-price fixing-rather than substitute a scheme of
regulation? See note 149 supra.
170. In a recent administrative proceeding before the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, this was precisely the situation. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Vaughn Motor
Co., Docket No. 0960-6-18-79 (Tenn. Motor Vehicle Comm'n 1979). The hearing officer's
conclusions showed that the statute was for the protection of local dealers. Id. at 5 (copies of
the relevant documents from this administrative proceeding are on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review). Does this legislation favor dealers or the public? Recall the discussion in note
106 supra. When the hearing officer was shown that wages should be the reimbursement
standard in order to have motivated mechanics who will give good service to the public, his
response was that "this is not Vaughn Motor Company's problem. If they are able to pay their
mechanics and get what they consider a satisfactory performance, then they should be allowed to charge whatever rate is necessary in order to maintain a properprofit margin." Id.
at 6 (emphasis added). The hearing officer thus determined the dealer's rate of $20.00 coupled
with a mechanic wage rate of $6.66 per hour to be reasonable "in light of economic circumstances."
171. In the Volkswagen administrative decision, note 170 supra,there was evidence that
the dealer had moved in order to accommodate another manufacturer's line of cars and that
due to the relative amounts of warranty work on the two lines of cars, the higher Volkswagen
reimbursement rate subsidized the dealer's other business. See Complainant's Exceptions
and Argument In Response To Hearing Examiner's Proposed Decision at 4, Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Vaughn Motor Co., Docket No. 0960-6-18-79 (Tenn. Motor Vehicle Comm'n
1979) (Copy on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
172. The Volkswagen hearing examiner considered this "overwhelming." Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Vaughn Motor Co., at 2.
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the need for a uniform, perhaps national, reimbursement rate that
13
is weighted more heavily upon mechanics' wages.
8.

Penalties and Civil Damages

Among the more common penalties for manufacturer mistreatment of its dealer is suspension or revocation of the manufacturer's
license to do business within the state. 7 4 Several states provide that
75
such revocations may be limited to a certain geographic area.
When a license revocation is so limited, however, there appears little
173. The formula proposed in the Volkswagen decision by the manufacturer reimbursed
the dealer at 240% of the mechanics' hourly wage plus 150% of the mechanics' hourly fringe
benefits. A short form election allowed the dealer, at his option, to be reimbursed at a flat
255% of mechanics' wages. Interestingly, the hearing officer termed the Volkswagen formula
a "very sound standardized formula for setting reimbursement rates on a nationwide basis."
He also determined that "[the dealer's] rates are excessive when considered in light of
[Volkswagen's] formula." Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added). Thus, we are left with a dealer's
reimbursement rate that was legitimate because it was "excessive" when compared to a "very
sound" formula, an interesting result indeed. One other peculiarity of Tennessee is that prior
to 1977 the statute called for "adequate and fair" compensation using the "unfairly without
due regard to the equities" language. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(h)(7) (1968) (statute
no longer in force). In 1971, the State of Tennessee entered a consent decree with General
Motors, which had challenged the constitutionality of the statute. General Motors Corp. v.
McCanless, No. 5107 (M. D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 1971) (a copy of this consent decree is on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review). The decree incorporated a schedule of compensation that reimbursed the dealer at 220% of the mechanics' base rate plus 150% of the average hourly fringe
benefits including paid vacations, pay in lieu of vacation, holiday pay, sick pay, separation
allowance, hospital insurance, retirement or pension plan, uniforms and laundry, and group
life insurance. The State and GM agreed that this was "fair and adequate" and therefore in
compliance with TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714(h)(7) (1968) (statute no longer in force). With
the passage of the new statute, the decree is effectively abrogated. Could this possibly be a
contract clause violation since it was the State's contract (consent decree)? See United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). Might the new statute also have retroactively
abridged the rights of contracts (franchises) that were entered into prior to the passage of the
new statute and that had incorporated the above formula? Cf., id. (impairment, if any, of
contract is to be weighed against public policy interest underlying impairing legislation).
174. Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1323 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2306(A) (1979);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-118 (1978); CONN. GE. STAT. ANN. § 14-67c (West Supp. 1979); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 320.64 (West 1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6610 (Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-2-7 (Burns Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2308, -2309
(1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:1255 (West Supp. 1979); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-212
(1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-85 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1411.02 (1978); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.33 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 565 (West Supp.
1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 805(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 315-23 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1714 (Supp. 1979); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36),
§ 4.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-8(3) to -8(4) (1953); VA. CODE § 46.1537 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.101 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(3)
(Supp. 1979-1980).
175. ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1323(C) (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-2306(B) (1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.642 (West 1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 846610(a)(4) (Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-2-7(c) (Burns Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2308(f) (1975); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-87 (1972).
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concern for either a terminated dealer or the needs of the public. 7 ,
On the other hand, to revoke the manufacturer's license for the
entire state would seem clearly unconstitutional,'77 highly impractical, and likewise harmful to the public.
Other states regulate the conduct of manufacturers through
criminal sanctions. 78 These have been termed "unworkable" because they depend upon the state for enforcement and are not sufficiently flexible for the regulation of the complex manufacturerdealer relationship. 7 ' Other fines and penalties, however, may be
slightly more practical if they are severe enough to deter unfair
manufacturer conduct. 180 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these
176. This does not overlook the other grounds for revocation of the manufacturer's license
such as "forcing," failure to deliver autos, or discrimination among dealers. See e.g. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 59-1714(c) (Supp. 1979). Note that the grounds for revocation of the manufacturer's license have nothing to do with the public good-instead they focus upon the good of
the dealer. In any event, what benefit accrues to the wronged, perhaps terminated, dealer
when the manufacturer's license is revoked? Furthermore, think of the other dealers penalized
by revocation of the manufacturer's license. This consideration has caused one commentator
to suggest that fines and perhaps criminal penalities are more practical. See Note, supra note
13, at 1020-21. See also Note, supranote 164, at 1243. If a manufacturer's license is terminated
in a state (extreme) or even a locality, those members of the public who desire to purchase
automobiles of that particular manufacturer would necessarily be burdened. Furthermore,
the competitors would probably be thrilled, particularly the other dealers in the area. In this
context, see note 244 infra and accompanying text.
177. As one commentator has stated, "although no problem of discrimination against
out-of-state products is involved, the statutes may be considered objectionable because the
revocation of a license to do business in a state . . .will operate to prohibit completely the
transporation of automobiles into that state for sale." Note, supra note 164, at 1244. See St.
Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 368 (1914). See also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511 (1935); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). For a discussion of the commerce
clause challenge, see note 106 supra.
178. ALA. CODE § 32-17-2 (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1326 (1976); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 75-2308 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-121 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.70 (West
1975) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); HAwAn REV. STAT. § 437-35 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 49-2419
(Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-5-1 (Bums Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1257
(West 1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1186 (Supp. 1979-1980); MiNN.

STAT. ANN.

§§

325.15-.23 (West 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-105 (1972); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51614 (Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-3:17 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1616 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-308 (1978); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.99 (Page Supp. 1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 564 (West Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 812 (Purdon
Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5-27 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1718 (Supp. 1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-3 to -27 (1953); VA. CODE § 46.1-522 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
218.01(8) (Supp. 1979-1980).
179. Note, supra note 164, at 1243.
180. Note, supra note 13, at 1021. Cf. Note, supra note 164, at 1243 (expressing fear that
some penalties may not be severe enough to deter prohibited conduct). Several states presently impose fines on the manufacturer. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.698 (West 1975) (repealed
eff. July 1, 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-5-2 (Bums Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2309(b)
(1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:1256(C) (West Supp. 1979); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15212(c) (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.15-.23 (West 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-105
(1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.36425 (1977); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 199 (Supp. 1979-1980);
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statutes appears to depend upon the court's willingness to imply a
private right of action, although an implied tort theory of recovery
could restrict the damages available to the dealer."'
Commentators have thus noted that express rights of action
with civil damages for wronged dealers constitute the most favorable means of regulating the manufacturer-dealer relationship. Several states have taken heed and passed statutes giving those harmed
a private right of action.8 2 Some provide only for "damages,"',
while others give double"" or treble"8 5 damages. Attorneys' fees are
also a common element of recovery.' 8 '
9.

Summary

There is a vast array of state statutes that deal specifically with

the automobile dealer-manufacturer relationship. There has been
little litigation under the statutes, possibly because many use language that at best can be termed confusing and present many interpretation difficulties. This is in sharp contrast to the large numbers

of suits that are brought under the Federal Good Faith Act.
The manufacturers' most effective attack against state legislation has been by constitutional challenge." 7 Statutes have been attacked as "vague and uncertain,""' as burdens upon interstate commerce,"' and as special interest legislation.110 Nevertheless, these
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1718 (Supp. 1979); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.01
(Vernon 1976).
181. See Note, supra note 164, at 1243.
182. E.g., ARK.STAT. ANN. § 75-2309 (1979); ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1173 (Supp.
1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325.236 (West 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-13 (Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-3-18 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.70.190 (Supp. 1978); W. VA.
CODE §§ 47-17-6 to-7 (Supp. 1979). See also notes 183-86 infra.
183. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-122(1) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.697 (West Supp.
1979) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6612 (1979); HAwAu Rav. STAT. § 43736 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-10-5-5 (Bums Supp. 1979); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-213
(1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 12A (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 445.532-.533 (Supp. 1979-1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-101 (1972); NEV.REV. STAT. §
482.36411(2) (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:3(lI) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:10-10 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-13 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5107-01.1 (Supp. 1979); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 565(j)(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.06 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
184. S.C. CODE § 56-15-110(1) (1976).
185. COLo. REV. STAT. § 12-6-122(2) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.697 (West Supp.
1979) (repealed eff. July 1, 1980); MONT.REV.CODES ANN. § 51-615 (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-16-13 (1978); S.C. CODE § 56-15-110(3) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(9) (West
Supp. 1979-1980).
186. See generally notes 183-85 supra.
187. S. MACAULAY, supra note 70, at 135.
188. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956) (invalidating Colorado law in its entirety).
189. E.g., American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 445 F. Supp. 902
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statutes persist' 9' in the face of criticisms that they offer benefits
that are "illusory at best," that they are "confusing,"' 9 and that
they "raise grave constitutional questions,"' 93 a "number of consti9 5
tutional problems,"' 94 or are of "questionable constitutionality."'
Although there are a variety of possible constitutional infirmities in these statutes, this Note focuses on only one-the composition of the board or commission that administers the system of
regulation. Regardless of the substantive provisions of a particular
system, the greatest infirmity occurs when the entire system is administered by the very parties whose relationship with the manufacturer is being regulated-the dealers.
IV.

THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO BOARD COMPOSITION

A.

Background

In many states motor vehicle franchise legislation is administered by agencies that are composed primarily, if not totally, of
automobile dealers.'" Rarely, if ever, does a manufacturer or a manufacturer representative have even one seat on these boards, much
less a chance for meaningful participation or representation. These
same boards, however, exercise great control over the manufacturer.
They often oversee the licensing of the manufacturer and resolve or
adjudicate manufacturer-dealer conflicts that concern termination
and establishment of franchises and the reasonableness of warranty
rate reimbursement. It is this arrangement, this Note submits, that
offends all notions of fairness and due process and therefore should
(E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979); Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle
Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter
Oldsmobile, Inc., 381 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1978); General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.
2d 360, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960).
190. See General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d
194 (1977); S. MAcAULAY, supra note 70, at 138; Brown & Conwill, supra note 107, at 231-33.
191. Professor MacAulay states that the manufacturer's greatest victories were
achieved in 1956, when they succeeded in completely overturning the Colorado and Arkansas
statutes. General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956); Rebsamen Motor
Co. v. Phillips, 226 Ark. 146, 289 S.W.2d 170 (1956). He adds that "[i]n Colorado apparently
the manufacturers won a lasting victory." But see CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 12-6-101 to -213 (1978).
Concerning Arkansas, Professor MacAulay noted that "the franchised dealers would have
trouble if they attempted to have a fourth statute passed." The other three were invalidated
or voted down in a referendum by the voters after being put on the ballot through the efforts
of manufacturers. The dealers were unsuccessful until 1975. See 1975 Ark. Acts No. 388,
codified as ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2301 to -2312 (1979).
192. Brown & Conwill, supra note 107, at 231-33.
193. See Comment, supra note 133, at 737.
194. Note, supra note 44, at 1244.
195. See Brown & Conwill, supra note 107, at 237.
196. See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
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be among the highest priorities in the reform of this area of the law.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution generally provide that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property "without due process of law.", 7 In the area
of due process hearings, the Court has traditionally placed great
weight upon neutrality-"the right to an impartial decisionmaker"-in every case. 9 8 Because "the appearance of evenhanded
justice . . . is at the core of due process,""' the Court has disqualified even those decision-makers with "no actual bias" if they reasonably appearedto be biased.2 ® Thus, the Court has disqualified
judges and decision-makers without a showing of actual bias in
situations in which "experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to
be constitutionally tolerable." '0 Among the situations identified by
the Court as presenting that risk are those in which the judge or
decision-maker
2
(1) has a pecuniary interest in the outcome;' 2
(2) "has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party
before him";'
(3) is "enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner . . .,,;211
or
(4) might have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an
accuser, investigator, fact finder or initial decision-maker.2 5

1. Pecuniary Interest
The landmark case regarding due process limitations upon pecuniary conflicts of interest is Tumey v. Ohio,20 1 in which a mayorjudge, in addition to his regular salary, was paid a certain sum per
case in liquor law violation cases in which he found the defendant
guilty. Reviewing the analogous cases in the area, the Court noted
that, in the past, "the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer,
judicial or quasi judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter
197. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
198. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
199. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 469 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
also Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
200. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972) (bias of decisionmaker
is ground for reversal); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (same result).
201. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
202. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
203. 421 U.S. at 47 n.15.
204. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971).
205. 408 U.S. at 485-86; 397 U.S. at 271; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
206. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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which he was to decide, rendered the decision voidable." ' 7 The
common law thus showed "the greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest, however small or infinitesimal." 2
With these principles in mind, the Court held that the Ohio
system under which the mayor-judge received fees for convictions
was a denial of due process. The Court noted that due process was
not satisfied by the argument "that men of the highest honor and
the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without the danger of
injustice.""2 ' Instead, every procedure that offered "a possible temptation to the average man

. . .

not to hold the balance nice, clear

the state and the accused denies the latter due
and true between
210
process of law.

'

The Tumey doctrine was recently extended in Ward v. Village
of Monroeville." IIn Ward, the mayor-judge had no direct pecuniary
interest in convicting the accused, but the fines he levied constituted somewhere between forty and fifty percent of the village revenues. Finding a violation of due process, the Court stated that the
mayor-judge's interest as chief executive officer of the village presented a "possible temptation" by which "the mayor's executive
responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court."' '
Although the foregoing cases involved due process in the criminal context, the Court in Gibson v. Berryhill,213 extended the
Tumey-Ward rationale to the administrative arena. The issue in
Gibson was whether the Alabama Board of Optometry was a fair
tribunal to determine whether it was "unprofessional conduct" for
an optometrist to practice in Alabama as a salaried employee of a
business corporation. The Board of Optometry consisted exclusively
of privately practicing optometrists and included none who were
either salaried or employed by business corporations. Furthermore,
207. Id. at 524.
208. Id. at 525.
209. Id. at 532.
210. Id. The Court went on to point out that the pecuniary interest of the mayor was
not the sole reason for finding a denial of due process. Here, the Court focused upon the
position of the mayor with respect to the city and stated:
With his interest, as mayor, in the financial condition of the village, and his responsibility therefor, might not a defendant with reason say that he feared he could not get a
fair trial or a fair sentence from one who would have so strong a motive to help his village
by conviction and a heavy fine?
Id. at 533. The Court thereupon held that defendant was entitled to halt the proceedings

because the judge was disqualified in two ways-because of his direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome and because of his official motive. Id. at 535.
211.
212.
213.

409 U.S. 57 (1972).
Id. at 60.
411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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only privately practicing optometrists were eligible to become members of the Alabama Optometric Association, and by statute only
such members could sit on the Board of Optometry. The Association
filed charges of unprofessional conduct with the Board of Optometry
against nine optometrists who were employed on a salaried basis by
Lee Optical Company, a business corporation. Upon filing of the
charges, the Board of Optometry deferred hearing thereon and filed
its own lawsuit in state court charging Lee Optical Company and
its optometrist-employees with unlawful practice of optometry.
After prevailing " ' in the trial court, the Board prepared to hear
and decide the charges levelled by the Association. Approximately
two weeks before the scheduled hearings, the individual optometrists brought suit 15 in federal district court seeking an injunction
against the hearings on the grounds that the statutory scheme of
optometry regulation was unconstitutional. The thrust of the complaint was that the Board was biased and could not provide plaintiffs with the fair and impartial tribunal required by due process.
Thereafter, a three-judge court entered judgment for plaintiffs and
enjoined the hearings, stating that the inquiry was not whether the
Board members were "actually biased but whether, in the natural
course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to
an average man sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or
against any issue presented to him."" 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on the issue of
bias but vacated and remanded the decision for reconsideration in
214. The state court dismissed the suit as to the individuals, but enjoined Lee Optical
Company from practicing optomery without a license and from employing licensed optometrists. Id. at 569.
215. Plaintiffs sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
216. Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. 122, 125 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The possibility of bias
was found to arise from a number of factors. First, the Board, which acted as both prosecutor
and judge in delicensing proceedings, had previously brought suit against the plaintiffs on
virtually indentical charges in the state courts. This indicated to the district court that the
Board members might have "preconceived opinions" with regard to the cases pending before
them. Second, the court found that the Lee Optical Company did a large amount of business
in Alabama, and that if it were forced to suspend operations, the individual Board members,
along with other private practitioners of optometry, would fall heir to this business. Thus,
there existed a "serious question of a personal financial stake in the matter in controversy."
Finally, the court regarded the Board as a suspect adjudicative body because only members
of the Alabama Optometric Association could be members of the Board, and because the
Association excluded from membership optometrists (such as the plaintiffs) who were not
self-employed. The result was that 92 of the 192 practicing optometrists in Alabama were
denied participation in the governance of their own profession. 411 U.S. at 571. Therefore,
the district court ultimately concluded "that to require the Plaintiffs to resort to the protection offered by state law in these cases would effectively deprive them of their property, that
is, their right to practice their professions, without due process of law and that irreparable
injury would follow in the normal course of events." 331 F. Supp. at 126; 411 U.S. at 571-72.
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light of two later state court decisions.21 7 The Court noted that the

district court considered either source of possible biasprejudgment of the facts or personal interest-sufficient to disqualify the Board. The Court, however, affirmed only on the
ground of "possible personal interest," stating that the financial
stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared in Tumey and
that "the pecuniary interest of the Board of Optometry had suffito disqualify them, given the context in which this
cient substance
28
case arose." '
2. Personal Abuse
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania2 ' exemplifies the personal abuse
strand of the analysis. In Mayberry the Court was concerned with a
criminal trial in which defendant, who represented himself, repeatedly engaged in disruptive conduct and made insulting and slanderous remarks to the judge.2 When defendant was brought before the
judge for sentencing after the jury found him guilty, the trial judge
pronounced him guilty of eleven criminal contempts arising from his
conduct during the trial and sentenced him to a total of eleven to
twenty-two years thereon. The sentence was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.22
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
222
decision, terming the attack on the judge "vicious" and "brazen.
The Court concluded that the judge, when "called upon to act in a
case of contempt by personal attack upon him," should have asked
that one of his fellow judges take his place, since there were
"marked personal feelings . . . on both sides. ' ' 22 Thus, the Court
concluded that Mayberry had been denied due process since a judge
who was so cruelly slandered was unlikely to have maintained "that
calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication,

22

a fact that de-

217. In the interim, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, see note 214 supra,holding that nothing in the Alabama statutes pertaining to optometry evidenced "a legislative policy that an optometrist duly qualified and licensed under the
laws of this state may not be employed by another to examine eyes for the purpose of
prescribing eyeglasses." Lee Optical Co. v. State Bd. of Optometry, 288 Ala. 338, 346, 261
So. 2d 17, 24 (1972).
218. 411 U.S. at 578-79. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
219. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
220. For example, he called the judge a "dirty sonofabitch," a "dirty tyrannical old
dog," a "stumbling dog," and a "fool" and charged the judge with running a "Spanish
Inquisition," and told him to "Go to hell" and "Keep your mouth shut." Id. at 455-62.
221. Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969).
222. 400 U.S. at 462-63.
223. Id. at 464.
224. Id. at 465.
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prived the "proceeding of the appearance of evenhanded justice
' 12
which is at the core of due process.
3.

Enmeshment in Other Matters

22
Johnson v. Mississippi
1 demonstrates the situation in which a
litigant is denied due process by reason of the judge's enmeshment
in other matters involving the same litigant. In Johnson, petitioner,
a civil rights worker, was charged with criminal contempt and ordered removed from the court. Before a hearing could be held on the
contempt charge, however, petitioner filed a motion asking that the
judge recuse himself on the grounds of personal prejudice against
petitioner, the civil rights organization he represented, and the lawyers' organization that was defending him. 27 The trial judge held
petitioner in contempt and the Mississippi Supreme Court af2 8
firmed. 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam
decision. The Court emphasized that it was not relying totally on
the affidavits of lawyers reciting intemperate remarks of the judge
concerning civil rights litigants. "Beyond all that was the fact that
[the judge] immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was
a defendant in one of petitioner's civil rights suits and a losing party
at that. 22' Since that "so enmeshed [him] in matters involving
petitioner," it was appropriate that another judge sit because
"[tirial before 'an unbiased judge' is essential to due process. "230

4.

Prejudgment Because of Prior Involvement

In In re Murchison"I the Court overturned a Michigan system
under which a judge could preside in a contempt proceeding after
having served as the one man grand jury out of which the contempt
charges arose. 2 Focusing upon the difficulty of freeing the judge
225. Id. at 469 (Harlan, J. concurring).
226. 403 U.S. 212 (1971).
227. Five days before being adjudged in contempt, petitioner and others filed suit to
enjoin trials of negroes and women in the Circuit Court of Grenada County until such time
as negroes and women were not systematically excluded from juries. Judge Perry, who was
to hold petitioner in contempt, was a named defendant. The federal court, two days before
petitioner was adjudged in contempt, temporarily enjoined Judge Perry from discrimination
"by reason of race, color, or sex" in jury selections. See id. at 214.
228. Johnson v. State, 233 So. 2d 116 (Miss. 1970).
229. 403 U.S. at 215.
230. Id. at 215-16.
231. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
232. In Murchison, the judge, so acting as grand jury, charged two witnesses with
contempt, one for refusal to answer any questions, and the other for perjury. The same judge
subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced them for contempt. Id. at 134-35.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:385

from the influence of what took place in the "grand jury" session of
the judge's familiarity with the facts,23 the Court held that the
procedure was a denial of due process because the judge, in passing
knowlon guilt or innocence, very likely relied on "his own personal
234 .
[there].
occurred
had
what
of
impression
and
edge
Prior involement as a basis for disqualification or "combination
of functions," as it is often referred to, emerged again in Goldberg
v. Kelly,2 5 in which the Court held that New York's provision for
post-termination hearings did not meet the procedural due process
requirement for termination of welfare benefits. Instead, the Court
required that recipients be afforded an evidentiary hearing before
termination of benefits. The Court added, however, that "of course,
an impartial decision maker is essential" and while "prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare
officer from acting as a decision maker, [h]e should not . . have
participated in making the determination under review." ' 6
More recently, in Withrow v. Larkin,27 the Court eschewed a
flat rule that prior involvement of a tribunal as accuser, investigator, or prosecutor necessarily precludes participation as adjudicator.
In Withrow, a state examining board, composed of practicing physicians, first investigated and issued findings and conclusions regarding probable cause to believe a physician had violated statutes regulating the practice of medicine and then determined whether in fact
the statutes had been violated. Although the Court concluded that
"the combination of investigative functions does not, without more,
constitute a due process violation," this "[did] not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is
intolerably high."23 The Court nevertheless held the mere combina233. Id. at 138.
234. Id.
235. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
236. Id. at 271. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court held that a
parolee is entitled to a hearing before a "neutral and detached" board before his parole is
revoked and to a preliminary determination that there is probable cause to hold him pending
that hearing. The preliminary determination that reasonable ground exists for revocation of
parole should be made by someone not directly involved in the case. Id. at 486.
237. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
238. Id. at 58. The Court distinguished Murchison, Goldberg, and Morrissey:
Clearly, if the initial view of the facts based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial
processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a
subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial due process
question would be raised. But in our view, that is not this case.
Id. The Court pointed out that Morrissey actually stood for the proposition that when review
of an initial decision is mandated, the decision maker must not be the one who made the
initial decision under review. Thus, allowing a decision maker to review and evaluate his own
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tion of functions did not overcome the presumption of honesty and
integrity of those serving as adjudicators,2' even though it reaffirmed the underlying principles of the prior decisions in the area.4 0
5. Summary
The due process clause, through its guarantee of an impartial
tribunal in which to adjudicate disputes, works in four distinct
ways. Due process is violated if the adjudicator has a pecuniary
interest in the outcome, if the adjudicator has been the target of
personal abuse by the litigator, or if he is "enmeshed" in other
matters involving the litigant. Finally, due process may be violated
by combination of investigative and adjudicative functions. In order
to utilize the separation of functions challenge, however, one must
also overcome the presumption that agencies are acting in good
faith in carrying out their duties. Only one of these four challenges
must succeed in order to find a denial of due process. In this regard,
one must apply the standards set forth by the Court to motor vehicle
legislation to determine whether the particular state board that is
charged with administering the statute comports with due process.
B.

Applicability of the Due Process Challenge to State Motor Vehicle Authorities

The challenge to board composition would be available only in
those states in which the administrative authority that regulates the
manufacturer-dealer relationship is composed totally or primarily of
automobile dealers.24 ' Thus, in those states in which there is no
agency, or in which there is an independent state authority, or in
which supervision is left to the courts, presumably the manufacturers are being treated fairly. Before turning to the cases in which the
due process-board composition challenge has been voiced, however,
it is instructive to review several of the functions of these boards,
many of which are weighted totally in favor of the automobile
dealer.
First, the board may be concerned with licensing the manufacprior decisions raised problems that were not present in Morrissey since the board was at no
point called upon to review its own prior decisions. Id.
239. A party must thus convince a court that the conferral of investigative and adjudicative powers upon the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that

the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. 421 U.S. at 47.
240. "Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but our 'system
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.'" Id. See also
notes 206-10 supra.
241. See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
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turer as well as other dealers.4 2 This is particularly important in
states in which license revocation is used as a sanction 4 since all
the board members then have inherent pecuniary interests. For example, if the manufacturer's license is called before the board for
revocation and several of the board members were also franchisees
of that manufacturer, would these members be so willing to revoke
their own supplier's license to sell automobiles within their state?
One would think not because this would force every franchisee of
that particular manufacturer out of business due to his franchisor's
loss of license. On the other hand, suppose that franchisees of competing manufacturers who were on the board believed that they
could gain competitively by revoking another manufacturer's license and thereby driving opposing dealers out of business. When
viewed in this light, the similarity to Gibson v. Berryhill becomes
painfully obvious."
Furthermore, these same authorities may oversee and decide
whether terminations or establishment 4 ' of particular franchises are
proper. Similarly, an automobile dealer would be biased in virtually
every case. When a dealer is to be terminated by the manufacturer,
the only question is in whose favor the board may be biased. If the
dealer-members appreciated their positions as franchisees, they
might be biased in favor of the dealer.2 "1On the other hand, if they

considered the effect of the gain or loss of one dealer on their businesses, their perception of the equities might tilt in favor of the
manufacturer. This consideration is especially appropriate when a
manufacturer seeks to establish a new franchise in an area.
One final situation in which the bias of the dealer-members
may arise is when they are called upon to decide the reasonableness
242.
243.
244.

See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 174-77 supra and accompanying text.
That, however, could be the incredible result, particularly in those states that have

no statutory provision allowing the board to limit license revocation to a particular area. It
could happen even in some states that give the board discretionto so limit license revocation.

See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, this bias would exist if dealers'
licenses were being considered for revocation. The only difference is in magnitude.
245.

See notes 121-43 supra and accompanying text.

246. This analysis was used in American Motors Sales Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd.,
69 Cal. App. 3d 983, 138 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977), in which the court stated:
The conclusion is unavoidable that dealer-members of the Board have an economic stake

in every franchise termination case that comes before them. The ability of manufacturers to terminate any dealership, including that of a Board member, depends entirely

upon the Board's interpretation of "good cause." It is to every dealer's advantage not to
permit termination for low sales performance, which fact is to every manufacturer's
disadvantage.

Id. at 987, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 596. The same rationale applies when one decides what warranty
reimbursement is "fair and adequate." It is to every dealer's advantage, including those on
the Board, to keep reimbursement rates high.
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of a manufacturer's warranty rate reimbursement. 247 Here, although
the self-interest of the dealer making the decision is not directly in
issue, it is certainly highly relevant. In the back of the memberdealers' minds are their own warranty reimbursement rates. If they
feel their own rate is adequate, then a dealer whose rate is higher
might be denied that rate although it be entirely reasonable. Quite
often, however, the converse is true. If a dealer's rate is deemed
"reasonable" by the board, then the dealer-members of the board
would feel justified in increasing their own reimbursement formulas.
Thus, there could be a never-ending cycle, a result highly inequitable to manufacturers.
With the number of statutes regulating manufacturer-dealer
relations, it is probably not surprising that the courts have spoken
to this particular aspect of the regulatory schemes. Ford Motor Co.
v. Pace211 exemplifies both the pre-Gibsonjustification and the postGibson arguments that favor the validity of these boards. In Pace,
a successful challenge was made to the entire Tennessee motor vehicle regulatory scheme in the trial court. The Tennessee Supreme
Court, however, reversed the lower court and upheld the validity of
24
the scheme. '
One challenge made to the Tennessee statute was based on the
fact that the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission was entirely
composed of dealers. Ford contended that the Commission was inherently biased and partial. The court rejected this challenge,
pointing out that "practically all the regulatory boards" were
"made up of members of the profession which that board governs"
and who have "knowledge of their profession." 0 To the court, the
247. See notes 159-73 supra and accompanying text.
248. 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960), rehearing
denied, 364 U.S. 939 (1961).
249. In so doing, the court considered a number of challenges to the act's validity. For
example, the statute was initially alleged to be outside the scope of the police power since it
did not promote "the health, safety, moral or general welfare of the general public." Id. at
564, 335 S.W.2d at 362. This the Tennessee court brushed aside in a flurry of citations,
quotations, and the "judicial knowledge" that "[tihe highways are crowded." Id. at 564-65,
335 S.W.2d at 362-63. The number of vehicles and their importance to society are sufficiently
important to warrant regulation of motor vehicles, but how does that reach the manufacturerdealerrelationship? Perhaps today a court would not so glibly brush aside the argument that
these laws are not within the scope of the police power, particularly after General GMC
Trucks. See note 106 supra. The court likewise put aside any notions that the law burdened
interstate commerce through citations and quotations from state cases holding in accordance
with their views while finding "unpersuasive" a contrary decision in General Motors Corp.
v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D.Colo. 1956). 206 Tenn. at 572-74, 335 S.W.2d at 366. See
notes 106 & 151 supra. The court, however, did find two small portions of the act unconstitutional. 206 Tenn. at 580, 335 S.W.2d at 369.
250. Id. at 575, 335 S.W.2d at 367.
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reason for this was "obvious."'5 Obvious or not, it is doubtful that
this rationale could survive analysis under current Supreme Court
analysis.252
At least one court has recognized the effect of subsequent decisions upon the Pace reasoning. In American Motors Sales Corp. u.
New Motor Vehicle Board23 the California Court of Appeals held
that the mandated presence of four car dealers on the New Motor
Vehicle Board, when considered in combination with a lack of any
counterbalance in mandated manufacturer members, the nature of
the adversaries in all cases (dealers versus manufacturers), and the
nature of controversy in all cases (manufacturer-dealer dispute),
operated to deprive manufacturer-litigants of due process for want
of an impartial tribunal.2s4 Tracing the history of due process limitations on pecuniary conflicts of interest,2ss the court noted that the
Board was erroneously equating the issue with that involved in cases
holding that a regulatory body may constitutionally be composed in
whole or in part of members of the regulated profession.2B The court,
however, stated that in the instant case "[n]o longer did the Board
solely sit in judgment upon new car dealers in such matters as
eligibility and qualification for a license, regulation of practices,
discipline for rule violations, and the like." 7 Instead, the Board
"was given the added power to intrude upon the contractual rights
and obligations of dealers and their product suppliers."' 25 Thus, the
court noted that instead of merely regulating their own kind, the
dealers began to regulate the economics of contractual relations of
others with their own kind. This factor, in the court's view, took the
case outside the traditional rule of peer regulation because car dealers had no unique or particular expertise appropriate to the regulation of business affairs of car manufacturers.
The court was nevertheless careful to state that its holding did
not rest on the mere status of the dealers. Instead, the dealers were
held to have a "substantial pecuniary interest" in franchise termination cases.2 9 This, coupled with the mandated presence of dealers
251.

Id. One wonders why that is so obvious here.

252.
253.
254.
255.

See notes 196-240 supra and accompanying text.
69 Cal. App. 3d 983, 138 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977).
See id. at 992, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Id. at 988-90, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98. See notes 206-18 supra and accompanying

text.
256. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 990, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
257. Id. at 991, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99.
258. Id., 138 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
259. Presumably, if they have a "substantial pecuniary interest" in franchise termination cases, they would also have such interests in establishment cases, license revocation

1980]

FRANCHISE ACTS

on the Board, prevented fair and unbiased hearings in violation of
due process.2'" The dealer's association, as amicus curiae, argued
that any bias was insignificant since in cases in which the franchise
of a dealer-member's direct competitor was being terminated or in
which the member wished to ingratiate himself with his own manufacturer, the dealer-member would be more financially interested in
ruling in favor of the manufacturer. The court rejected the argument,26 ' but the mere fact that it was made demonstrates an incredible fact-dealers are willing to incur occasional unfairness to one of
their own kind rather than risk losing their stranglehold on manufacturers.
Other courts have been unwilling either to follow or recognize
the decision in New Motor Vehicle Board. The Georgia courts, at
approximately the time of the California decision, reached a con26 2
trary result in General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
while simultaneously holding portions of its motor vehicle franchise
statute unconstitutional on much broader grounds. In General
GMC, the trial court ruled that the composition of the Georgia
Franchise Practices Commission 23 caused it to be prejudiced in
favor of franchised dealers because they comprised a majority of the
commission. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court in
rather cryptic fashion. The court merely cited the general rule that
it is acceptable for members of a profession to serve on commissions
that oversee the practices of that profession, and stated that
"members of a commission are presumed to be fair and impartial.

' 264

In the court's view, the manufacturer had failed to overcome

that presumption.
Similarly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Volkswagen of

America v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission,265 upheld a state
cases, and warranty reimbursement cases under the court's test since in each situation all
the factors of the test remain the same. For those factors, see text accompanying note 254
supra.
260. The California court perhaps gave the Tennessee court a dose of its own medicine,
finding the Pace decision "not. . .persuasive." Id. at 992 n.7, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 599 n.7. See
note 249 supra.
261. Id. at 987, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 596. The court viewed this not as fairness but as
equalizing unfairness with more unfairness. The argument's appearance suggests that the
court was persuaded by the "appreciation of similar position" argument voiced by this author. See text accompanying note 246 supra. This line of analysis would most clearly carry
over into the warranty rate reimbursement cases. See notes 167-73 supra.
262. 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977). See note 106 supra.
263. The commission was composed of nine members, five of whom were required to
be dealers. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6604 (1979).

264. 239 Ga. at 375, 237 S.E.2d at 195.
265. Davidson Equity No. A-7901-I (Tenn. App. Sept. 8,1978). The appellate court,
with no opinion of its own, merely quoted the Chancellor's memorandum opinion from the
trial court.
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board. The statute creating the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission is neutrally worded, requiring only that members be actively
engaged in the manufacturing, distribution, or sale of motor vehicles. 66 To date, however, these industry members have consisted
solely of automobile dealers. This is unsurprising because the statute requires members to be residents of Tennessee, 267 and no manu-

facturers are. Thus, they are precluded from board participation
irrespective of the neutral wording of the statute. Confronted with
this fact and the resulting inherent unfairness of the Board, the
court responded:
The record in this case does not show the composition of the Commission....
The plaintiff argues, that since there are no manufacturers in Tennessee, there
are no representatives of manufacturers on the Commission. However, the
record is completely silent as to that point. The Court will not notice matters
of an agency will
outside the record to rebut the presumption that members
8
discharge their responsibilities in an honest manner.

Both the Tennessee and Georgia courts, therefore, relied upon
the "presumption of good faith" language of Withrow and the fact
that other regulatory boards were composed of regulated members.
In due process analysis, however, good faith is relevant only in situations in which the due process violation allegedly consists of a
"combination of functions" within the particular agency.2 9 Thus,
when the alleged violation is a pecuniary interest, no amount of
good faith will rescue the commission. As the United States Supreme Court stated, "[t]he requirement of due process of law...
is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and
the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice.

' 270

Therefore, these courts do not carry their analysis far

enough. "Separation of functions" alone is probably not enough to
strike down these commissions, but their demonstrated and recognized 17 pecuniary interest is. From this, one can only conclude that
these courts have erred and that many motor vehicle commissions
violate due process irrespective of the fact that other commissions
266. See note 117 supra. At approximately the same time the suit arose, the Tennessee
General Assembly increased the size of the commission, adding two "consumer" members.
1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 162, § 14 codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1703 (Supp. 1979).
267. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1703 (Supp. 1979).
268. Volkswagen of America v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Comm'n, Davidson Equity
No. A-7901-I (Tenn. App. Sept. 8, 1978) at 3-4. In so holding, the court ignored the manufacturer's argument that Tennessee courts were bound ex officio to know the officers of the
government. See e.g., Bennett v. State, 8 Tenn. 133 (1827); Brief for Volkswagen at 18,
Volkswagen of America v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Comm'n, Davidson Equity No. A-7901-I
(Tenn. App. Sept. 8,1978).
269. See notes 231-40 supra and accompanying text.
270. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. at 532.
271. See note 259 supra and accompanying text.
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regulating other professions are often composed of members of that
profession." It is these states that need reform most urgently. 27 3
V.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

It is abundantly clear that state motor vehicle franchise legislation is plagued by a number of problems, board composition being
merely the one defect upon which this Note has focused.2 14 Corrective action is needed either at the state or federal level to provide a
system of regulation that is fair to both the dealer and the manufacturer. Undoubtedly, dealers would oppose such legislation. 27 5
272. A central concern in many of these cases seems to be that many commissions
regulate their own kind and that to hold motor vehicle commissions unconstitutional would
call into question the integrity of many other regulatory boards. In New Motor Vehicle Board,
the Board in its brief listed 21 other boards, a majority of whose members were also members
of the regulated profession. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 986 n.4, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 596 n.4. Similarly,
in the Volkswagen case the courts were bombarded with a list of 34 other boards that were
made up of regulated members. See Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission's reply to petition
for certiorari at 30-31 (Copy on file with Vanderbilt Law Review). This, however, overlooks
the fact that many of these commissions, unlike motor vehicle commissions that regulate such
things as warranty rate reimbursement and manufacturers as well as dealers, actually have
built in protections against the possibility of bias. Cf., e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-807
(Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n-no person having an interest in the liquor industry may have
a position on the commission); TEN. CODE ANN. § 63-601 (Board of Medical Examiners-no
board member may have a connection with a medical school); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-402
(Board of Cosmetology-no board member may have a connection with a beauty school);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-402 (Board of Examiners of Chiropractors-no board member may
have a private practice or a connection with a school). As was so well stated by the California
court in New Motor Vehicle Board:
We have no quarrel with [the holdings that licensing or regulatory agencies may constitutionally be composed in whole or in part of members of the business or profession
regulated]. Indeed who can better judge the qualifications to practice of a doctor of
medicine (as one example), or his adherence to ethical standards of the medical profession, than other doctors of medicine?
[The motor vehicle board dealers, however, do not] regulate their own kind; they ...
regulate the economic and contractual relations of [manufacturers and] - . . car dealers
have no unique or peculiar expertise appropriate to the regulation of business affairs of
car manufacturers.
69 Cal. App. 3d at 990-91, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99. To this argument, what can be the
response?
273. These states include Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississipp, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas. As
previously noted, however, while the primary thesis of this Note has focused upon the denial
of due process with respect to certain motor vehicle boards, massive reform is urged due to
the host of constitutional problems that face the legislation as a whole. Several of these
challenges have been suggested but not fully developed. See notes 106, 133, 136, 163 & 169
supra and accompanying text.
274. The Note, however, did attempt to lay the framework for a number of challenges.
See notes 106, 133, 136, 163 & 169 supra. Hopefully, this will be of use to the practitioner or
legal scholar who finds himself imprisoned in this area of the law.
275. Recall the fate of the proposed Motor Vehicle Act of 1940. See notes 68-69 supra
and accompanying text. Dealers opposed the bill ostensibly on the ground that they feared
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State Regulatory Reform

Possibly the best reform that any state could undertake is repeal of those laws that are administered at a very high cost. This
would cause dealers little detriment since many of the protections
they seek are covered quite handily under the Federal Good Faith
Act. Under the Act they are protected against bad faith terminations, establishment of "stimulator" dealers, "forcing" of unwanted
automobiles and parts, and coercion through discrimination among
dealers.276 Furthermore, the manufacturer is held to a standard of
good faith in the manner in which he reimburses his dealer for
warranty work or sets sales quotas. 27 The dealers do lose something
in those states that provide for more damages. 5
In any event, states that utilize boards or commissions to administer their statutes and that are within those criticized in this
Note should immediately abolish these agencies and transfer their
responsibilities to another board. For example, in many states,
these could be easily handled by the states' public service commission, or its equivalent. 29 These commissions traditionally handle
such matters as licensing routes for truck lines and hearing requests
for rate increases by utilities and carriers. 20 Their expertise would
carry over to such areas as establishment of dealer franchises and
hearings on warranty rates.
"extensive federal regulation." Kessler, supra note 31, at 1172. Yet, that bill contained many
protective provisions that the dealers have since begged for. Compare C. HEwIrT, supra note
13, at 266-72 (Motor Vehicle Act of 1940) with statutes discussed in Part II D supra. Thus
the dealers have swapped "extensive federal regulation" for extensive, confusing, vague, and
possibly unconstitutional state legislation that they feel is more favorable.
276. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1978).
278. The Dealer's Day In Court Act provides only for actual damages, 15 U.S.C. § 1222
(1976), while several states allow recovery of double or treble damages. See notes 184-85 supra
and accompanying text.
279. For example, there is no reason why the duties of the Tennessee Motor Vehicle
Commission could not be transferred to the Tennessee Public Service Commission. See TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 65-101 to -68 (Supp. 1979). The Commission already regulates railroads, public
utilities, and motor carriers and has the power to regulate rates. Also, no member may have
an interest in any business or company that the Commission regulates. TENN. CODE ANN. §
65-104 (1976). The California legislature, in response to American Motors Sales Corp. v. New
Motor Vehicle Board enacted CAL. VEH. CODE § 3050(d) (West Supp. 1979), which provides
that "no member of the board who is a. . . dealer may participate in, deliberate on, hear or
consider, or decide, any matter involving [termination or establishment of franchises or
warranty reimbursement]." Similarly, Kentucky provides that the dealer board shall have
no control over manufacturers. Ky. REv. STAT. § 190.041 (Supp. 1978). These states and those
that either have no board or utilize the courts or other law enforcement authorities as administrators demonstrate that states may function very well without dealer supervision of manufacturers.
280. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-401 to -407, 65-1501 to -1525 (Supp. 1979).
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Warranty rate reimbursement is another area of concern. Those
states that presently allow the dealer to charge whatever he
pleases"5 ' should undertake drastic changes. These legislatures
should either create a formula that accounts for the relevant factors
that affect the public interest 8 2 or model legislation after those
states that seem to have achieved a fair and equitable balance between the interests of the dealers and the manufacturers, as well as
those of the public.m
Last, the states should be wary of protecting dealers from legitimate competition through restrictions on establishment of other
franchises. If the true concern in this situation is, as it should be,
the needs of the public, presumably a similar analysis as is utilized
in deciding whether to grant a truck line a new route could be
used.2'1 That is, a commission or other body would concentrate upon
the good to the public that would flow from additional dealerships.
One should not conclude from this discussion, however, that
states should remain in the motor vehicle franchise game. The automobile industry is a national industry that demands uniform standards to replace the present hodgepodge of conflicting state provisions. Thus, federal reform is needed in order to impose uniformity
and nationwide dual fairness.
B.

Proposal-An FTC FranchiseAgreement

The Federal Trade Commission is the obvious agency with
which to vest the power to oversee the manufacturer-dealer franchise relationship. Many of the abuses that dealers fear are termed
"unfair practices" over which the FTC has traditionally exercised
authority2 5 Furthermore, this would not be the first time that a
281.
282.
283.

See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
See note 164 supra and accompanying text.

284. This is traditionally decided on the basis of "public convenience and necessity."
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1507 (Supp. 1979). At least one state uses this standard for
the establishment of automobile franchises. See S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN. § 32-6A-3 (1976).
285. The Supreme Court has ruled that the FTC has broad remedial powers in enforcing
its mandate under the FTC Act to prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices. In Jacob
Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946), the Court noted that "[t]he FTC is the expert body
to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate unfair or deceptive practices which have
been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except
where the remedy has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practice found to exist." Id. at
612-13. The Court has also recognized the FTC's authority to determine what trade practices
are unfair or deceptive and has given the FTC broad latitude in this. See FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). Furthermore, it is now recognized that the FTC has the
power to promulgate rules having the effect of substantive law which could preempt state law.
See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 951 (1974).
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proposal has been made to grant the FTC such authority."'8
Under this proposal, either Congress, through legislation, or the
FTC, through rulemaking, would promulgate substantive terms for
automobile franchise agreements. Under this arrangement, it would
be an unfair or deceptive act within the meaning of section five of
the act for a manufacturer to distribute automobiles in interstate
commerce unless the distribution takes place pursuant to written
franchise agreements that contain the terms set forth by law.21 7 This
would not be an overly burdensome task for the FTC since it has
recently promulgated a trade regulation rule, formally titled
"Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising
and Business Opportunity Ventures. ' 28 The rule requires franchisors to disclose to prospective franchisees detailed information
about their franchises prior to investment in the franchise. It also
prohibits representations concerning actual or potential sales or relating to income or profits of existing or prospective outlets unless
the representations meet certain standards. 8 '
Since the FTC has already undertaken this extensive regulation
of franchises, it would impose little additional burden to amass
those terms that should be legislated because existing or proposed
statutory or industry standards could be employed. 20 Therefore, one
need only be concerned with the areas to be covered. The proposed
terms cover those that have traditionally caused problems-termination, coercion, "forcing" of unwanted automobiles
and parts, delivery, and warranty reimbursement. Presumably,
under such standards a party would have either a federal or state
cause of action in the event of a breach of the "legislated" con2
tract. "1
286. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, in many states there
would be little change since the statutes require the motor vehicle franchise authority to be
"guided" by the FTC Act and the FTC interpretations thereof. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1184 (West Supp. 1978-1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B, § 3 (West 1972); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-B:15 (Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-5.1-3 (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE
§ 56-15-30 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4073 (Supp. 1979).
287. See APPENDIX infra, for the most pertinent terms proposed.
288. FTC Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1979).
289. 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1979). See generally FRANCHISING, supranote 1, at 24-27; Goldberg,
Federal Regulation of Franchises:The Federal Trade Commission Rule, 99 CHI. B. REC. 338
(1978); Zeidman, Regulation of Franchisingby the Federal Trade Commission: A Critique
of the Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 28 Bus. LAW. 135 (1972).
290. That is the approach taken in the proposal. See APPENDIX infra. Much of the
proposal is drawn from the ill fated Motor Vehicle Act of 1940, see note 65 supra and accompanying text, and the reimbursement formula found by one court to be "fair and adequate."
See note 173 supra. Omitted from the provisions are definitional sections and other boilerplate language that either Congress or the FTC would employ to implement the proposal.
291. The dealer or manufacturer would presumably have a binding contract on which
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C. Conclusion
Motor vehicle dealers were traditionally subjected to many unfair and oppressive practices by their manufacturers. With the passage of the Dealer's Day In Court Act, many of these practices
effectively came to a halt. Dealers nevertheless have pressed for
extensive legislation in the states that is either impractical or constitutionally suspect. This legislation has reversed the traditional
balance of power in many instances, putting manufacturers at a
great disadvantage. To give true parity to the relative bargaining
and operating positions of the manufacturer and dealer, reform,
preferably on the federal level, is sorely needed.
GARY MICHAEL BROWN
to sue in either federal or state court. A provision might also be included for an express right
of action allowing recovery of double or treble damages should Congress enact a separate
provision. Should the FTC promulgate the provisions as a rule, apparently no private right
of action would exist, since section 5 of the FTC Act has been interpreted to offer no implied
private right of action. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tex. 1942). See generallyMowe, Federal
Statutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 ORE. L. Ray. 3 (1976).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED SUBSTANTIVE AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE TERMS

(a) Every contract between a manufacturer of motor vehicles and
a dealer in motor vehicles to which this act [rule] applies shall:
(1) Obligate the manufacturer, for a specified period of time (in no case less
than three years) to sell and deliver in each month of such period to such dealer
for resale such number of motor vehicles as may be agreed upon not more than
180 days prior to the beginning of such month, and obligate the manufacturer
not to discriminate among dealers in either sales or deliveries; provided, however, that the manufacturer shall not be liable for nonperformance resulting
from an Act of God, strike, war, invasion, riot, insurrection, fire, flood, or other
incident that is outside the control of the manufacturer;
(2) If the contract authorizes or permits the manufacturer to control the
dealer's business, within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section, obligate
the manufacturer, upon termination or failure to renew the contract:
(i) to purchase from the dealer all new motor vehicles purchased by the
dealer from the manufacturer and unsold by the dealer and all parts and
accessories likewise purchased and unsold, at prices equal to those originally paid by the dealer for such motor vehicles, parts, and accessories
delivered at the dea'ler's place of business;
(ii) to purchase all tools and equipment purchased from or on recommendation of the manufacturer, at prices to be mutually agreed upon,
or in the event of failure to agree, at prices determined in accordance
with subsection (d) of this section;
(iii) to purchase all motor vehicles purchased by the dealer from the
manufacturer and used as demonstrators at prices to be mutually agreed
upon, or in the event of the failure to so agree, at prices determined in
accordance with subsection (d) of this section;
(iv) to purchase all used motor vehicles in the dealer's inventory [other
than those described in paragraph (iii)] at prices to be mutually agreed
upon, or in the event of the failure to so agree, at prices determined in
accordance with subsection (d) of this section;
(v) to assume any lease entered into by the dealer, with the written
consent of the manufacturer, during the period of the contract or any
prior contract;
(vi) in the case of any lease entered into by the dealer without the
written consent of the manufacturer, to assume such lease for the period
beginning on the effective date of the contract cancellation and ending
on the date on which such contract would have expired by its own terms
or would have expired by reason of a failure to renew; and
(vii) to purchase all other assets of the dealer that are attributable to
his activities as a dealer in motor vehicles at prices to be mutually agreed
upon, or in the event of the failure to so agree, at prices determined in
accordance with subsection (d) of this section;
(3) Adequately define the duties and responsibilities of each of the manufacturer's agents contacting the dealer, directly or indirectly;
(4) Obligate the manufacturer not to ship to the dealer any motor vehicles,
parts, or accessories except on the dealer's written order;
(5) Obligate the manufacturer, if a transportation charge is made, to charge
the dealer for transportation of motor vehicles to the dealer's place of business
only such transportation costs as are actually incurred in transporting such
motor vehicles to such place;
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(6) Obligate the dealer, for a specified period of time (in no case less than
three years), in each month of such period to purchase from such manufacturer
for resale such number of new motor vehicles as may be agreed upon not more
than 180 days prior to the beginning of such month; provided, however, that
the dealer shall not be liable for any failure of performance caused by an Act
of God, strike, war, invasion, riot, insurrection, fire, flood, or other incident
that is outside the control of the dealer;
(7) Include such provisions that the Commission has found:
(i) provide for the termination or cancellation of the contract by mutual consent or upon breach of specified conditions contained therein,
and not otherwise;
(ii) provide that the contract may not be cancelled by the manufacturer or dealer without giving written notice thereof at least 180 days
prior to the date of cancellation; and
(iii) provide that if, within 180 days prior to the date on which the
contract would expire by its own terms, neither the manufacturer nor the
dealer notifies the other of an intention not to renew the contract, the
contract shall be automatically renewed on such date for an additional
period equal to the period of the original contract.

(b) A manufacturer "controls" his dealer for the purposes of this
section if the contract contains any provision that the Commission
finds:
(1) To purport to control in any manner the capital investment which the
dealer shall make, or purports to control in any manner capital withdrawals
or withdrawals of earnings and profits by the dealer;
(2) To purport to control in any manner the character of sales rooms, service
facilities, or signs that the dealer shall maintain;
(3) To purport to control in any manner the employment of sales or service
personnel by the dealer, or to require the maintenance by the dealer of any
specified volume of sales;
(4) To purport to require the dealer to comply with any one or more policies
specified by the manufacturer, or by any of his agents; or
(5) To authorize or permit the manufacturer by any other means to control
the manner in which the dealer shall conduct his business.

(c) Every contract between a manufacturer of motor vehicles and
a dealer in motor vehicles shall provide for warranty rate reimbursement to the dealer in the following manner:
(1) On parts used for warranty work, the manufacturer shall credit the
dealer's parts account with the actual cost to the dealer of such parts and, in
addition, shall pay the dealer a handling charge thereon equal to twenty-five
percent (25%) of such actual cost of the part.
(2) On time allowances for the performance of repair or replacement work the
manufacturer shall publish a flat rate schedule, setting for the time required
for individual service operations; provided that the times fixed by the manufacturer shall be reasonable as found by the Commission.
(3) On warranty labor rate reimbursement, the manufacturer shall reimburse
the dealer for labor utilized to fulfill the manufacturer's warranties in the sum
of:
(i) Two hundred twenty percent (220%) of the mechanic's hourly wage
rate; and
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(ii) One hundred fifty percent (150%) of the mechanic's hourly fringe
benefits, which shall include paid vacation, pay in lieu of vacation, holiday pay, sick pay, separation allowances, hospital insurance, contributions to retirement or pension plans, uniforms and laundry, and group
life insurance.

(d) Every contract between a manufacturer of motor vehicles and
a dealer in motor vehicles to which this act [rule] applies shall
obligate both the dealer and the manufacturer to accept the decision
of an arbitration committee that consists of one member selected by
the manufacturer, one member selected by the dealer, and one
member selected by the Commission, in all instances under this
section in which the parties have provided for but cannot reach a
mutual agreement.

